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Abstract
This thesis argues that the EU has indirectly influenced domestic perceptions of the past in 
postwar Croatia and Serbia through these states’ desire for EU membership. Informed by EU 
conditionality criteria, which include democratic policies, regional cooperation, and issue-
linkage with the ICTY, political elites have tailored new discourses that confront past 
atrocities to improve EU trajectory. However, the depth of this process—called “the politics 
of memory,” has differed in both states primarily because Serbia was unable to extradite their 
war criminals at the pace of Croatia. This was the result of negative patterns that stemmed 
from the dynamics of regime transition, and the strength of old regime spoilers and 
nationalist parties who have perpetuated myths and discourses of victimisation in the new 
regime. In addition, desire for EU membership itself has fluctuated because of greater contest 
at the elite level between reformist and nationalist politicians.
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List of Abbreviations
CEE 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EC 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EU 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FRY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 Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica) 
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RSK   Republika Srpska Krajina
SAA   Stabilisation and Association Agreement
SAP   Stabilisation and Association Process
SDP  Social Democrat Party (Croatia)
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 South-East European States 
SFRY  Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
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 Serbian Progressive Party
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UN 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Introduction
Memory is said to play a central role in the very foundation and stabilisation of the modern, 
spatially differentiated international system (Bell 2006). For example, the memory of Nazi 
atrocities has become a defining part of the structure of European politics since 1945, and the 
September 11 terrorist attacks have only intensified the interest in memory in the twenty-first 
century (Langenbacher 2010). Yet, it is not the ongoing process of social memory-making that 
is of critical importance to scholars. Rather these aforementioned moments in history have in 
common their propensity for being seen as traumatic events. In particular, people who 
experience traumatic events, such as war, rely on collective memory to come to terms with 
their or their nation’s past. An honest and contrite confrontation with past atrocities is 
argued to help the reduction of threat perceptions abroad, re-establish the rule of law, and 
improve confidence and societal trust (Langenbacher 2010, 38).
 The Yugoslav War in the 1990s was one such war that left a great burden of past 
atrocities on the backs of the young independent states, Croatia and Serbia. The burden 
includes indictments of crimes against humanity, violation of the laws or customs of war, 
and genocide. Although the indictments are against individuals, these crimes were 
committed in the name of the nation, and collective memory of the War subsequently made 
heroes and villains out of every ethnicity involved in the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Yet, 
during the second half of the 1990s, there was no serious confrontation of the past. Instead, 
narratives of victimisation emerged in national consciousnesses as ethnic hatred persisted in 
the authoritarian societies of Croatia and Serbia.
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 In the meantime, an emerging actor in the Western Balkans, the EU, opened a 
pathway that would see these states recover from the economic disasters of war and provide 
them with a secure future under the umbrella of EU membership. Since the democratic 
transition of both states in 2000, the desire for EU entry has been a defining feature of 
Croatian and Serbian domestic politics. Yet, by becoming “potential candidates,” these states 
had also entered into a period of post-authoritarian social memory-making, called “the 
politics of memory,” where a state interprets and appropriates its past in a post-authoritarian 
context—a process that is qualitatively different to the social memory-making that occurs in 
times of peace and normality (Barahona de Brito 2010, 359-60).    
 The concept of the politics of memory has been applied mostly to transitional justice 
literature to broaden the effect of the past on transitional societies beyond the narrow limits 
of the field. International relations literature that has incorporated studies of memory focus 
their attention on postwar Germany, September 11, and the numerous countries that have 
been affected by atrocities. Yet, the politics of memory as a concept, and memory politics in 
general, have surprisingly not been employed in detail in the Western Balkan region. Where 
relevant, only references to Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina have been made. Another gap 
that exists is ignorance over the role of supranational organisations in the politics of memory. 
This is unfortunate considering an increasingly globalising world attests that political 
influence on national elites is multilayered despite the pre-eminence of the nation-state. For 
this reason, the question this thesis asks is, how has Croatia and Serbia’s desire for EU 
membership affected their domestic perceptions of the past, particularly in how narratives of 
the Yugoslav War have been tailored in light of the desire for entry? 
 Accordingly, by answering this question, the thesis will fulfil its aim, which is to 
provide a detailed study of how the politics of memory has been enacted in the specific 
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contexts of postwar Croatia and Serbia by tracing the change in the narratives of the past, 
from the end of the Yugoslav War, to the present day, accounting for the reasons why these 
changes occurred, and analysing the obstacles to these changes. The significance of this body 
of work is that it necessarily combines the interdisciplinary nature of memory politics with 
post-authoritarian studies, nationalism, democratic transition studies, Europeanisation 
literature, transitional justice literature, and the domestic politics of Croatia and Serbia, as a 
means for understanding the complexity of Western Balkan politics. It is also a timely study 
considering the probable accession of Croatia to the EU in July 2013.  
Argument
This thesis argues that the EU has indirectly influenced domestic perceptions of the past in 
postwar Croatia and Serbia through these states’ desire for EU membership. Informed by EU 
conditionality criteria, which include democratic policies, regional cooperation, and issue-
linkage with the ICTY, political elites have tailored new discourses that confront past 
atrocities to improve EU trajectory. However, the depth of this process—called “the politics 
of memory,” has differed in both states primarily because Serbia was unable to extradite their 
war criminals at the pace of Croatia. This was the result of negative patterns that stemmed 
from the dynamics of regime transition, and the strength of old regime spoilers and 
nationalist parties who have perpetuated myths and discourses of victimisation in the new 
regime. In addition, desire for EU membership itself has fluctuated because of greater contest 
at the elite level between reformist and nationalist politicians.
Outline of Thesis
The first chapter offers a brief review of the relevant literature on memory politics, 
Europeanisation, and transitional justice. Chapter Two traces how the indirect influence of 
the EU has moved perceptions of the past in Croatia from a discourse of victimisation, to the 
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individualisation of war crimes, and finally, to a ‘normalisation’ of the country, made 
possible because of an Europeanised Croatian identity. Chapter Three examines the changing 
perceptions of the past in postwar Serbia, emphasising the importance of the arrest of 
Serbia’s high-profile war criminals who act as measurable indicators to the EU that Serbia is 
coming to terms with its past. The chapter also exposes the difficulties impeding narrative 
change beyond the democratic transition in 2000. Chapter Four compares Croatia and Serbia 
to reflect on the similarities and differences concerning the process and depth of the politics 
of memory. The thesis then concludes by identifying the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for outworking the politics of memory in transitional states.
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Chapter One
Masterminding the Past: Understanding EU Influence 
& the Politics of Memory 
This chapter provides an overview of the relevant literature needed to understand the main 
thrust of the thesis, which explores how the desire for EU membership has indirectly 
influenced domestic perceptions of the past in postwar Croatia and Serbia. For this reason, 
literature and debates surrounding memory studies, national identity and “the politics of 
memory” are discussed. Furthermore, an understanding of Europeanisation literature and 
EU conditionality criteria is provided, along with the theory and practice of transitional 
justice. Finally, comments on the methodology of the thesis will be made.
Memory Studies 
There are definitional challenges that underpin the study of memory, which explains why it 
has not been well-theorised and applied within the discipline of international relations. One 
challenge concerns disagreement over the proper distinction between history and memory. 
Academics who seek to clarify this distinction (Hodgkin & Radstone 2003; Bell 2006) define 
memory similarly: the capacity or faculty of retaining and reviving facts, events or 
impressions, or of recalling or recognising previous experiences. It is what keeps the past—or 
at least a highly selective image of it—alive in the present, whereas history is simply what 
happened before (Bell 2006, 2). This does not have to be a verifiable or accurate account: 
memory is knowledge from the past; It is not necessarily knowledge about the past (Bell 2006, 
2). This is a defining factor that differentiates memory from history, if indeed there exists a 
completely objective history—a debate in itself. 
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 Disagreement over the feasibility of studying ‘collective memory’ is yet another 
challenge for scholars. Simply put, collective memory is defined as a group of peoples’ 
widely shared perceptions of the past (Bell 2006, 2). It forms the story that groups of people 
tell about themselves, connecting past, present and future in a simplified narrative (Bell 2006, 
2). Some academics contest that it is impossible to have collective memory when memories 
are ultimately subjective, in that they are lodged in an individuals mind. However, James 
Wertsch (2002) calls collective memories “mediated narratives” that are determined publicly. 
Likewise, Alexandra Barahona de Brito (2010) argues that, although remembering is a 
process that is only undertaken by individuals, memories can also be socially communicated, 
as well as socially and historically embedded, and it is because of this we can speak of 
collective memory.  
 Scholars have acknowledged that the rise of constructivism in international relations 
provides a promising opportunity for integrating the influence of collective memory (Bell 
2006; Langenbacher 2010, 21). Critics of constructivism argue that it only provides a 
protracted critique of realism and liberalism, which favour the notion of objectivity and 
remain close to the natural sciences. However, constructivism is important because it views 
behaviour as socially constructed, historically determined and culturally contingent 
(Langenbacher 2010). This is because it is identity (a socially constructed meaning), and not 
fixed interests, that is crucial to agency (Horelt & Renner and Renner 2008, 9). In other 
words, it is the image actors hold about themselves and about others that matters, because an 
actor can know what he can do, only if he knows who he is (Horelt & Renner 2008, 9). 
Accordingly, memory studies scholars have found that collective memory is a major 
influence upon constructing identities and values within different mnemonic communities, 
particularly the nation-state, which will be explained below. 
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National Identity
Memory is most readily applied to an understanding of the construction, reproduction and 
contestation of national identities. National identity, in the dominant and widely accepted 
Western usage, concerns itself with the cultural aspect of the nation, whose members feel a 
sense of unity and homogeneity fostered by common historical memories, myths, symbols 
and traditions (Smith 1991, 11). In this case, memory is the proof and the record of the self’s 
existence, and the struggle over memory is the struggle over the self’s most valued 
possession (Bell 2006, 5). Anthony Smith (1996, 383) says, “No memory, no identity, no 
identity, no nation.” According to Schwartz (2000, 17) memory is a “meaning-making 
apparatus,” but it is also a “membership-making apparatus” at the centre of the creation of 
“imagined communities” (Anderson 1991).
 Identity is realised practically in a variety of ways. Horelt & Renner (2008) argue 
that identities are constructed through ‘constitutive stories,’ which rely on a narrative 
process. Therefore, one must identify the narrative of a collective political history, the 
discursive construction of a common culture, the discursive construction of a collective 
present and future, and the discursive construction of a ‘national body,’ amongst other 
things, to understand how identity is outworked (De Cillia, Reisigl & Wodak 1999). The 
identities can be articulated in written, symbolic, and oral mediums. Moreover, each 
mnemonic communities’ memory will be connected to “places, ruins, landscapes, 
monuments and urban architecture” (Misztal 2003, 16).  
 Memories can furthermore assign an actor a historical position of villain, victim, or 
liberator, allowing for the framing of international issues and negotiations (Langenbacher & 
Shain 2010). Problems can ensue when competing historical positions and narratives of the 
past emerge, because they will shape conflicting identities, which can complicate the state’s 
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interests and the subsequent actions they take. Croatia and Serbia are excellent empirical 
cases when studying the presence of conflicting identities given their history is a complex 
mix of independence, war, and cultural milieu from the influence of past empires under 
which they were subsumed. 
 For example, Horelt & Renner (2008), identify four conflicting narrative identities 
found in Croatia. The first is Croatia seeing itself as the heroic nation that stood up against 
Serbian aggression in the Yugoslav War. This would mean that Croatia presents itself as self-
confident and autonomous. Second, Croatia is framed as an innocent nation, which 
individualises guilt upon the “black sheep” who committed atrocities for Croatian 
independence. The third and fourth can be seen as two sides of the same coin; viewing 
Croatia as a Western nation, or as a Balkan nation. These four identities are said to exist 
simultaneously and compete with each other, so that one or another might gain dominance 
in certain points in time.   
 The authors who have studied Serbia (Lazic 2003; Ristic 2007; Konitzer 2011), have 
commented on the country’s political life being between the East (Russia) and the West (EU). 
Andrew Konitzer (2011) explores the “historical friendship” between Serbia and Russia and 
uses a discourse analysis of the rhetoric of different political elites in Serbia and in Russia to 
understand how they frame their relationship. Furthermore, survey data and opinion poll 
results show how attitudes towards the EU and Russia prove not just that Serbian elites are 
in-between, but that the Serbian public is too. Another proponent of this view, Irena Ristic 
(2007, 185), describes Serbia as an “unfinished state” with an “undefined nation.” Ristic 
(2007, 185) argues that formulating a clearly defined national identity would facilitate 
Serbia’s accession to the EU, which implies that, depending on which identity Serbian elites 
construct and enact, it could effectively influence EU trajectory.  
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The Politics of Memory 
For Croatia and Serbia, the Yugoslav War eventually brought sovereignty and peace, but it 
was only in their democratic transitions that serious questions were asked over their 
communist and authoritarian pasts, which included human rights abuses. War, in particular, 
is a definite cultural “time marker” in a state, as societies understand their history in three 
segments: before the war, during the war, and after the war (Goulding & Domic 2009, 89). In 
the aftermath of war, memory very clearly serves to either legitimate previous regimes (by 
confronting or hiding crimes), or it forges new claims to political legitimacy. This form of 
social memory-making has been conceptualised by Barahona de Brito (2010) as the politics of 
memory: 
The ‘politics of memory’ refers to the various ways that political elites, social 
groups and institutions reinterpret the past and the breakdown of civility and 
propagate new interpretative narratives about the ‘what happened’ to 
legitimate a new political dispensation and develop a new vision of the future 
for the polity. In contrast with transitional justice, which consists of policies and 
actions with relatively clearly defined outlines and that are more temporally 
limited, the politics of memory is connected with much broader processes of 
socialisation and identity formation. The politics of memory involves important 
shifts in the way societies view their past.
 There is a gap in the literature of empirical studies comparing the Serbian and 
Croatian “politics of memory.” First, the two countries have been largely ignored in case 
studies in edited books that incorporate memory studies with transitional justice and 
international relations (Barahona de Brito, Gonzalez-Enriquez & Aguilar 2001; Bell 2006; 
Langenbacher & Shain 2010). Second, no studies have properly conceptualised the reasons 
why multiple or ambivalent identities or narratives exist in both states, instead, they have 
only explored the different foreign policy options foundational state narratives can influence. 
In many cases, scholars have applied the famous George Orwell (1948/1989, 32) quote to 
understand this idea, namely, that, “Who controls the past, controls the future; who controls 
the present, controls the past” (Goulding & Domic 2009; Horne 2010). However, this thesis 
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argues that those foundational state narratives—before they determine the direction of the 
state—are determined themselves by a vision of the state political elites absorb (in this case, 
the prospect of EU membership) to enact the politics of memory in the first place. Thus, 
central to the politics of memory of Croatia and Serbia is the indirect influence of an external 
actor, the EU, and by indirect, this simply means the Croatian and Serbian perceptions of 
what the EU wants. Therefore, the literature of Europeanisation and role of EU conditionality 
criteria is a necessary addition to the thesis and will be summarised below.  
Europeanisation and EU Conditionality Criteria 
According to Claudio Radaelli (2003, 30), Europeanisation is defined as: 
Processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion (c) institutionalisation of formal and 
informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’, 
shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU 
policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and 
subnational) discourse, political structures, and public policies. 
Radaelli (2003, 35) provides a conceptual map that elucidates the domains wherein 
Europeanisation can take place. First, there are domestic structures, which include political 
structures of institutions, public administration, intergovernmental relations, and legal 
structures. This also includes structures of representation cleavages, like political parties, 
pressure groups, and societal-cleavage structures. The second area concerns public policy—
the actors, policy problems, style, instruments, and resources used. Third, there are cognitive 
and normative structures, such as discourse, norms and values, political legitimacy, 
identities, and state traditions, like the understanding of governance, policy paradigms, 
frames, and narratives. Although Heather Grabbe (2003) once conceded that there had been 
little convincing empirical work done on how the EU affects cognitive-normative structures, 
constructivists have taken on this task by exploring how Europeanisation affects state 
identities and, in reverse of the causal arrow, how state identities affect Europeanisation 
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(Cowles 2001; Subotic 2011). This is particularly true for Croatia and Serbia as they have been 
studied separately and in a comparative perspective concerning this area of research 
(Freyburg and Richter 2010; Subotic 2011; Konitzer 2011), and in the wider Europeanisation 
discourse (Türkes & Gökgöz 2006; Renner & Trauner 2009). 
 When discussing the effect of Europeanisation in non-member states, EU 
conditionality criteria for accession becomes an important tool and indicator of this process. 
The standard conditionality criteria the EU set out for CEE countries is encompassed in three 
main documents: the Maastricht Treaty, the Copenhagen Criteria and the framework for 
negotiations with a particular candidate state. First, Article 49 of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty 
1992 stipulated that any European country that respects the principles of the EU may apply 
to join (EC 2012d). Second, the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria further defined the rules that made 
a country eligible to join the EU. There are three aspects of the Criteria, which are 
summarised below (EC 2012d):
(a) Political: democracy, rule of law, human rights, and respect for and 
protection of minorities.
(b) Economic: a functioning market economy and checks that producers can 
handle competitive pressure and market forces within the EU.
(c) Legislative: enacting legislation to bring national law into line with 
European law (known as the acquis communautaire). The acquis is divided 
into chapters, each dealing with different policy areas. 
 Considering the above, the EU decides when a country is ready to become an “official 
candidate.” Then, the chapters of the acquis are opened after the final aspect of accession 
criteria—the framework for negotiations with a particular candidate—are organised. The 
framework monitors when and how each chapter is met, and it will signal when the EU has 
enough absorption capacity for a new member. Once the acquis chapters are closed, the 
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accession treaty is signed and candidates receive “acceding” status until the date of EU entry 
is reached.    
 However, EU conditionality criteria in SEE is more demanding than the above 
conditions because, after the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the Balkan states had more fragile 
economies, polities, societies, and the legacy of conflict (Anastasakis & Bechev 2003, 4). These 
factors produced stricter and more numerous steps in the conditionality criteria that mostly 
come before a country is deemed a “candidate.” Following Othon Anastasakis and Dimitar 
Bechev’s (2003, 7-8) outline, these additions are directed by the 1997 Regional Approach, 
which was replaced in 1999 by the SAP. Committing to the SAP includes:
(a) Stabilising the countries politically and encouraging their swift transition to 
a market economy, promoting regional cooperation, and offering eventual 
membership to the EU (the SAP countries become “potential candidates”). 
(b) Cooperation with the ICTY. 
(c) Signing the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) once progress 
has been made in meeting the SAP. The SAA produces benefits such as 
asymmetric trade liberalisation, economic and financial assistance, 
humanitarian aid for refugees and returnees, assistance for democratisation 
and civil society, cooperation in justice and home affairs, and the 
development of a political dialogue. 
(d) Conditions arising out of the SAA and Community Assistance for 
Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation framework.
(e) Conditions related to individual projects and the supplying of aid, grants or 
loans. 
(f) Conditions that arise out of the peace agreements and political deals 
(including Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council, and the Dayton, 
Ohrid, and Belgrade agreements). 
Anastasakis and Bechev (2003, 8) claim that EU conditionality in the Balkans is “a multi-
dimensional instrument geared towards reconciliation, reconstruction and reform. It is 
regional, sub-regional and country-specific; it is economic, political, social and security-
related; it is positive and well as negative.” With a focus on reconciliation, the SAP criteria 
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coalesces with transitional justice theory and practice, which will inevitably challenge the 
deeply held narratives and perceptions of the past in postwar Croatia and Serbia.
Transitional Justice
Transitional justice refers to the set of judicial and non-judicial measures that have been 
implemented by different countries in order to redress the massive human rights abuses of 
the past. Judicial transitional justice mechanisms include domestic trials, international trials, 
and more recently, trials in front of foreign courts (based on universal jurisdiction) and 
hybrid trials (mixed domestic-international courts) (Subotic 2009, 17). Non-judicial measures 
include truth commissions, reparations to victims, lustration, museums or other sites 
commemorating the victims, state apologies, community initiatives, unofficial mechanisms, 
or amnesties (Subotic 2009, 17-18). Crossley-Frolick (2011) claims that UN efforts to facilitate 
transitional justice, particularly in post-conflict settings, have been analysed, but argues that 
the EU’s role in promoting transitional justice is largely unknown. Thus, she identifies two 
ways the EU primarily supports transitional justice: through the EC, and through the EU’s 
common foreign and security policy. In the first case, the Instrument for Pre-Accession is the 
EC’s financial instrument for the SAP, and it includes various resources to help countries in 
need. In the second case, peace-building initiatives make transitional justice concerns linked 
with future enlargement scenarios.
 Borrowing the concept of issue-linkage from Subotic (2009), this thesis suggests that 
the EU is indirectly influencing perceptions of the past in Croatia and Serbia through issue-
linkage with the ICTY. The ICTY was established in 1993, and its primary role is to formally 
indict and try war generals and political leaders who held “command responsibility” over 
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the atrocities of which they are accused. Crossley-Frolick (2011) does acknowledge that the 
ICTY and conditionality criteria are also ways in which the EU promotes transitional justice, 
but she selected Bosnia as a case study, with no real mention of the Croatian or Serbian cases. 
Her ultimate question is left unanswered, “Whether the EU is truly committed to a “justice-
sensitive approach” to enlargement that more assertively promotes the need to confront the 
past in an effort to move forward” (Crossley-Frolick 2011, 47)?  Discussing this topic links to 
the wider Europeanisation literature, where it will help to develop how the EU changes 
cognitive-normative processes in Croatia and Serbia. 
 There is a porous literature on how transitional justice mechanisms have been 
politicised by domestic elites with incomplete implementation (Horne 2010, 976). Horne 
(2010, 976) suggests that it is the politics of memory which focuses on the way in which the 
reconstruction of the past is a political act, often instrumentally controlled to meet political 
ends. On the one hand, this paradigm draws into the thesis the necessity to gain knowledge 
of the domestic political situation in Croatia and Serbia to see what domestic dynamics are 
producing or hindering transitional justice and changed past perceptions. On the other hand, 
these studies still do not ask whether EU influence on domestic elites has changed Croatian 
and Serbian perceptions of the past as well?  Has one country received more pressure and 
coercion to face up to their past more than the other?  Are indicted war criminals in Croatia 
and Serbia perceived as perpetrators more than war heroes?
Methodology
This body of work is a comparative study of Croatia and Serbia, which adheres to the 
method of difference research design. Croatia and Serbia belong within the same geographic 
region of the SEE, or Western Balkans. They were formerly united politically in the Kingdom 
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of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes from 1918-1941, and within SFRY from 1945-1991, and both 
countries participated in the Yugoslav War from 1991-1995. As a result, the EU’s influence in 
the states will be more controlled because the same war (making time and place constant) 
can produce different perceptions of the conflict and other past events. As they are in the 
same region, the way the EU co-operates with both states is more controlled, and it is clearer 
to identify where their political trajectories have converged and diverged. They were also 
culturally united by the Serbo-Croatian language, which has, since independence, been 
separated into four different dialects.
 At the same time, Croatia and Serbia present differences in their main religion and 
in their EU trajectory. Croatia is an acceding country, set to formally become an EU member 
state in July 2013. Conversely, Serbia has only attained official candidate status in March 
2012, eight years after Croatia received official candidate status. This markedly different EU 
trajectory makes these two cases worthy of comparison, particularly when considering why 
it has taken Serbia longer than Croatia to arrest high-profile war criminals, and in asking, 
what was the role of collective memory in this divergence of trajectory? 
 This thesis relies on primary and secondary data, predominantly qualitative in 
nature, but where the qualitative data can be further substantiated, quantitative data shall be 
utilised. Academic literature from anthropological, ethnographic, historical, political science 
and social science approaches are drawn upon. Official and unofficial discourse from Croatia 
and Serbia is analysed in this thesis through the constructivist method of narrative analysis. 
Much of the material originally in Croatian and Serbian has been translated into English 
within academic and non-academic secondary sources, with other interview material 
available through English sources directly. Additionally, predominantly online journalistic 
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accounts and newspaper articles are gathered and they have been cross-checked before being 
used as a source where possible. 
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Chapter Two
Croatia: “The Mediterranean As It Once Was…” 
This chapter examines the changing domestic perceptions of the Croatian recent past over 
three main periods, from the conclusion of the Yugoslav War to the present. It first traces the 
final half of Croatian president, Franjo Tudjman’s leadership, from 1995 to the end of 1999. It 
then analyses past perceptions from the beginning of EU commitment to the country in 2000, 
to the end of formal co-operation with the ICTY at the end of 2005. The final period 
encapsulates the change of past perceptions during the EU accession negotiation process, 
which started in 2006, until the present day, where Croatia holds acceding status.  Through 
this analysis, it will be shown how the politics of memory in postwar Croatia has moved past 
perceptions from pure victimisation in the war, to the individualisation of war crimes, and 
finally, to a ‘normalisation’ of the country, made possible because of an Europeanised 
Croatian identity. It also shows how the latter two narratives and past perceptions have been 
indirectly influenced by the EU through conditionality criteria, including issue-linkage with 
the ICTY and the growth of transitional justice.  
 Each main section examines Croatian perceptions of the past in three ways: the first 
section provides a narrative analysis of official discourse that remembers the Homeland War 
and what the discourse achieved. The second section examines more specifically what the 
change in discourse meant for the status of war generals, ICTY cooperation and 
commemorations or apologies surrounding the Homeland War. The final section discusses 
EU influence and the politics of memory to determine the main causes for the changes in 
discourse over the three periods studied.   
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1995-1999: “Thousand Year Old” Dream Made Reality 
Remembering the Homeland War: The Freedom Train 
Croatian perceptions of the past are encapsulated within the very name for the conflict 
Croatia was involved in during the Yugoslav War—the “Homeland War.” The title holds 
connotations of victimhood, painting Croatia in a struggle to gain liberation from SFRY and 
the RSK, a Serb-controlled quasi state within Croatian territory. After almost five years, this 
liberation was achieved on 4 August 1995, with Operation Storm (henceforth Storm), a 
military attack on the nerve centre of the RSK—the city of Knin (See Appendix 1). 
 In keeping with the theme of liberation, Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic 
of Croatia since 1991, made a speech in Knin shortly after Storm, on 26 August 1995, during 
his journey on “The Freedom Train,” the reopening of the rail line from Zagreb to Split which 
had been blocked for five years by the RSK (Tanner 2010). Tudjman (1995) stated that, “As 
long as Knin was under occupation, the future of the Croatian state was not assured. Since 
Operation Storm, since today, it is.” These words can be interpreted as legitimising Storm for 
security reasons, despite the apparent devastation to the Serb community it caused in its 
aftermath. 
 The importance of Franjo Tudjman in this period of Croatian history cannot be 
underestimated. He is said to be the main constructor of the processes of Croatian national 
reformation and state-building (Uzelak 1997, 449). According to Uzelak (1997), Tudjman’s 
understanding of the foundation of the nation is deeply rooted in historical context (shared 
history, historical events, battles, kings, religion and customs). This idea is evident as the 
speech progresses, as Tudjman (1995) recounts the importance of Knin and situates the Knin 
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of that day to the one centuries ago, when it was formerly the capital city of the Croatian 
kingdom under King Zvonimir.  
 In this speech, derogatory language is used to characterise Serbs as “chetniks” (Serb 
nationalist and monarchist paramilitaries), with Knin being described as a “den of Chetnik 
anti-Croatianism.” The racial rhetoric continued as Tudjman addresses Croatian citizens:
[S]tart the revival of Knin, so we can populate it, and not just Knin, but also 
Benkovac, Obrovac and all the area up to the Plitvice lakes and Sisak. We must 
revive and build the whole of Croatia,  so it can become a country of which 
every Croat can be proud, and all Croats can be from today, and a country of 
wealth and happiness of all Croatian people. 
In this passage, there is no mention of integrating any Croatian Serbs back into the 
population. As many as 200,000 Serbs left for Bosnia or Serbia by 1995, which alludes to the 
ethnic cleansing that was so prevalent during the War. This discourse further reveals how 
Storm was based on the historical context of making Knin and RSK territory “Croatian” 
again after years of Serb and communist oppression. By liberating the territory, Tudjman 
called it, “The end of the Croatian crusade.”
 The narrative plot that can be reconstructed from Tudjman’s discourse is overall one 
overlain with historical, racial and religious allusions. Catholic Croatia was suffering through 
the oppression of Orthodox Serb “chetniks,” who, like “cancer” spread throughout their land 
for the sake of a “Greater Serbia” (Tudjman 1995). However, through the “wisdom” of 
Croatian decisions and leadership during Storm, the RSK disappeared in two to three days 
(Tudjman 1995). Storm turned Croatian victimisation into liberation, made Croatia 
“Croatian” again, and secured the sensationalised “thousand-year old dream” of statehood
—a notion Tudjman used to rally nationalistic support from the public (Hawkesworth 2008, 
xxv).
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War Generals, the ICTY and Official Commemorations: Croatia as Victim and Victor  
War crimes were not confronted in the Croatian perceptions of the past in this period. For 
example, Tudjman denied that atrocities were committed by Croatian war generals against 
Serbs in an interview shortly after Storm (CNN World 1995). Instead, he argued there were 
only unavoidable “casualties” on both sides in the operations during the fighting (CNN 
World 1995). The murder of Croatian army officer, Milan Levar, after agreeing to be a witness 
for the ICTY against other Croats exemplifies the covering of Croatian war crimes in this 
period (Allcock 2009, 369). 
 Moreover, the Croatian government hesitantly co-operated with the ICTY only 
when pressured by the international community (Pavlakovic 2009). Even though the “Law 
on the Cooperation with the ICTY” was adopted by the Croatian parliament in April 1996, 
Tudjman’s party, the HDZ, never fully accepted the law when it was passed and other 
opposition parties supported their stance (Subotic 2009, 86). Croatian authorities had 
prevented generals from speaking to ICTY investigators, and government and military 
documents were withheld. Subotic (2009) says the Croatian government was among the first 
states to demand that the international community establish a war crimes tribunal for 
atrocities committed during the Yugoslav War, but they were under the impression that it 
would only indict and try Serbs accused of war crimes against Croatians. Importantly, 
Tudjman himself was never indicted by the ICTY. Tudjman died in December 1999 from 
cancer, which meant that, unlike Milosevic and Serbia, Croatia would never see a head-of-
state tried by the Tribunal.
  Wider society was largely in favour of the protection of war generals by the 
government. High-profile war generals who would subsequently find themselves with ICTY 
indictments, such as Mirko Norac and Ante Gotovina, were prominent guests at the two 
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most important commemorations of the Homeland War—the siege and fall of Vukovar 
(November 18), and the Day of Victory and Homeland Thanksgiving marking the end of 
Storm (August 5) (Pavlakovic 2009), both of which focused exclusively on Croatian suffering 
and victory. 
EU Influence and The Politics of Memory: The Roadblock of Authoritarianism 
Observers have described the Tudjman regime as an authoritarian one (Kearns 1998; Tanner 
2010), and for this reason, it became a roadblock to developing closer relations with the EU 
(see Appendix 2, Period One). Tudjman’s authoritarian tendencies included his choice of 
personal friends and close colleagues, which indicated that he viewed the government as 
nothing more than the extension of his own office (Kearns 1998, 252). He also treated the 
Croatian parliament (henceforth, Sabor) as nothing more than a rubber stamp body (Kearns 
1998, 252). However, in the public view, his party, the HDZ, were losing popular support 
mainly because of accusations of corruption (Kearns 1998). Given the EU conditionality 
criteria discussed in Chapter One (See pp. 17-18), Croatia could not be considered ready for 
accession talks like the other CEE states who were able to fulfil the requirements of the 
standard conditionality criteria.  
 Authoritarianism subsequently became a roadblock to confronting the past in 
Croatia. Studies into collective memory, inspired by democratic peace theory, suggest that 
there is a correlation between regime type and collective memory; democratic regimes are 
more likely to come to terms with the “truthful” past as opposed to dictatorships 
(Langenbacher 2010). This is why the politics of memory is a form of post-authoritarian 
social memory-making. Croatia’s victim-centered, xenophobic narrative, along with 
defensive attitudes to war crimes would not allow for it to occur. Tudjman and his “old 
regime spoilers” with their nationalistic stances made it very difficult for alternative 
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discourses to emerge that risked criminalising the past and the regime. Therefore, 
authoritarianism became the roadblock that can explain why the EU exacted little indirect 
influence over domestic perceptions of the past in this period in Croatia.
2000-2005: War Heroes Or Villains? The Black Sheep In The Croatian Fold
Remembering the Homeland War: The Sabor’s Declaration
Croatian perceptions of the past underwent change with the democratic transition in 2000. 
The former League of Communists of Croatia transformed into the SDP, and won the 
elections in 2000, ousting the disfavoured and divided HDZ. The presidential elections 
followed, with Croatians electing the last president of SFRY, Stipe Mesic. With these changes, 
a new official discourse emerged. The Declaration on the Homeland War was written by the 
Sabor (2000), and it can be viewed as the official state narrative over what happened from 
1991 to 1995. According to paragraph two of the document:
The Republic of Croatia led a just and legitimate, defensive and liberating war, 
which was not an aggressive and occupational war against anyone, in which 
she defended her territory from the great Serb aggressor within her 
internationally recognised borders. 
The following plot can be reconstructed from this section: Serbia caused the war, Croatia was 
the victim, and was forced to defend herself as an effect of the Serbian aggression (Horelt & 
Renner 2008, 13). This is largely consistent with the narrative presented by Tudjman in 1995, 
although, there is less detail concerning the historical context of the War, and the language is 
less pejorative. 
 Yet, a discourse that would be further elaborated upon later in the period—the 
notion of the individualisation of crimes—emerged in this document: 
For the dignity of the Homeland War, the Croatian judiciary is obligated to 
process all possible cases of individual war crimes, grave breaches of 
humanitarian law and all other crimes committed during the aggression against 
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Croatia and armed uprisings […] strictly applying the principle of individual 
responsibility and guilt.
This paragraph does not specify which ethnicity would be prosecuted, leaving it open to “all 
possible cases,” which could subtly include Croatians who have committed crimes. The 
emphasis on the principle of “individual responsibility and guilt” absolves the state of 
criminal activity, and places it on “the black sheep in the Croatian fold,” (Horelt & Renner 
2008).  
 This discourse is undoubtedly strategic in nature, because it delicately achieved two 
important goals: first, it allowed for co-operation with the ICTY, as has already been proved 
in many studies (Horelt & Renner 2008; Freyburg and Richter 2010). Unlike Tudjman, Mesic 
and prime minister Ivica Racan were committed to hold domestic trials and co-operate fully 
with the ICTY, not only over Bosnian Croat suspects, but regular Croatian army figures 
suspected of war crimes in Storm (Steele 2000; Tanner 2010, 310). Conversely, it preserved the 
legacy of the Homeland War. President Mesic stated, “The Croatian nation should not and 
will not be a hostage to those who bloodied their hands, bringing shame upon Croatia’s 
name–no matter what credits they might have otherwise,” (Subotic 2009, 94). The thought of 
not confronting war crimes was framed as being harmful to Croatia, which signifies deep 
transformation compared to the Tudjman regime and the case of Milan Levar.    
 This discourse was strengthened by President Mesic (2005, 2) years later when he 
delivered a speech to the Igman Initiative members, an organisation that fosters better 
regional co-operation:
The truth about the past implies both apology, admission and repentance. In a 
court, be it an international or a national court, both accountability and guilt can 
and have to be ascertained exclusively on the individual basis. Nations are not 
guilty. The fact is,  however, that crimes were committed in the name of nations 
and under the cloak of the name of entire nations. It is therefore logical that 
expressions of apology come in the name of nations or states.
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This discourse has additionally incorporated the language of transitional justice, using terms 
such as “apology, admission and repentance.” Yet, Mesic states that transitional justice starts 
with the individual, with the state implicated within the conduct of the individual, and in 
this way, the state has a role to play in the reconciliation process. Mesic’s speech, though for 
the consumption of regional elites, illustrates how Croatia is gradually accepting the past 
and the conduct of their war generals, which is not based on emotion, but on fair and just 
legal principles. Importantly, this discourse promotes regional cooperation, a feature of EU 
conditionality criteria, making it understandable why Croatia had already become an EU 
candidate country by 2005 (See Appendix 2, Period Two).
War Generals, the ICTY and Official Commemorations: Croatia as Victim and Perpetrator
The discourse of individualisation allowed the government to confront war crimes, but it 
was not without contest at the societal level. This polarisation was evident in the case of 
former general Mirko Norac, who was wanted for the massacre of Serb civilians in the city of 
Gospic during the War (Tanner 2010, 310). This produced large protests around Croatia, led 
by nationalists, war veterans and army generals, many of whom saw Norac as a war hero. In 
this case, both the EU and the ICTY were sensitive to the domestic situation, not wanting to 
destabilise the pro-Western Racan government (Subotic 2009, 88). This meant that the Hague 
did not indict Norac at this point, which diffused the situation domestically. The government 
told citizens that their demonstrations were hurting Croatia’s international reputation and its 
appeal as a destination for foreign capital and tourism (Subotic 2009, 92). This is another 
example of the way individualisation discourse was reframing what is beneficial or harmful 
to Croatia. This example illustrates that perceptions of the past were changing, and resistance 
to these changes were faced relatively successfully whenever a new army officer was 
arrested.
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 As a result, the Croatian government improved its cooperation with the ICTY in this 
period, but challenges confronting the past arose when it became more obvious that the 
ICTY had constructed a counter-narrative which characterised Croatia not only as a victim, 
but also as a perpetrator of crimes (Pavlakovic 2009). For example, in March 2005, the 
Croatian Memorial and Documentation Centre on the Homeland Defence War sought to 
correct the media and the ICTY discourse, which focused disproportionally on Croatian war 
crimes, not crimes against Croats. This made the centre—a transitional justice mechanism—
biased (Subotic 2009, 108). Also in 2003, SDP prime minister Racan was replaced by Ivo 
Sanadar, who still promised to deliver EU membership to Croatia despite coming from the 
right-wing, nationalist HDZ. However, Sanader repeatedly declared that only Croatia can 
write its own history. This comment was clearly directed at the ICTY “rewriting” the 
narrative of the war in the 1990s (Pavlakovic 2009).
 Commemorations of Storm nevertheless changed with the democratic transition in 
2000. As the ICTY was able to fully investigate the Homeland War and more openly indict 
Croatian army generals, these national heroes, who actively attended the August 5 
ceremonies, were no longer publicly visible (Pavlakovic 2009). As a result, the rhetoric at the 
Storm commemoration changed, with Croatian politicians acknowledging that war crimes 
did occur and that there were Serbian victims as well, something that would have been 
prohibited during the Tudjman regime (Pavlakovic 2009). Croatian politicians had to address 
and incorporate the issue of co-operation with the ICTY at the commemorations (Pavlakovic 
2009). Due to the Racan government’s positive stance on compliance with the ICTY, Racan 
avoided going to Knin in 2002 and 2003, afraid that massive demonstrations would offend 
the symbolic place. Even Sanader’s HDZ faced counter-commemorations and protests in 
Knin (Pavlakovic 2009). 
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EU Influence and the Politics of Memory: The Double-edged Sword
Relations between the EU and Croatia had dramatically improved with the democratic 
transition in 2000, but the outstanding issue of capturing high-profile war indictee, Ante 
Gotovina, delayed the start of accession negotiations in March 2005 (See Appendix 2, Period 
Two).  Seven months later, ICTY chief prosecutor at the time, Carla del Ponte, announced 
that Croatia was fully co-operating with the ICTY even though Gotovina had not been 
located. It was on the evening of 7 December the ICTY fugitive was arrested in the Canary 
Islands of Spain (OSCE 2005). The Croatian government was vindicated because they were 
trying to inform the ICTY that Gotovina had not been in Croatia for years (Subotic 2009, 99). 
The reaction within Croatia was moderate, with official statements from various political 
parties and war veteran associations appealing for a calm response to the news (OSCE 2005). 
The public were dejected, but had to accept that Gotovina’s fate was now a legal matter 
(OSCE 2005, 1). Gotovina’s arrest closed the final chapter of Croatia’s relationship with the 
ICTY, at least in the sense that the Hague was no longer an obstacle to EU accession (Subotic 
2009, 99).
 Overall, it can be said that Croatia’s democratic transition fostered closer relations 
with the EU, which allowed for the politics of memory to ensue in Croatia. As a result, a new 
discourse of individualisation was developed by the political elite. It allowed for greater 
regional cooperation, the confrontation of war crimes, and changes over how the Homeland 
War was commemorated. Yet, the discourse proved to be a double-edged sword, polarising 
political elites and society when digesting the new victim-perpetrator identity of Croatia.  
2006-2012: Normalisation On The Road To The EU
Remembering the Homeland War: Unforgettable Operation Storm
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With the security of EU accession negotiations underway, would Croatia alter their 
perceptions of the past back to that of Tudjman’s regime, or would they continue to come to 
terms with the past and acknowledge war crimes committed against Serbs during the 
Homeland War?  To answer this question, it is important to realise that, in this period of 
Croatian recent history, the ICTY continued to affect political discourse and society. In 
mid-2006, the Sabor adopted a Declaration on Operation Storm, which was submitted for 
consideration by MP Slaven Letica because the ICTY decided to use the concept of “joint 
criminal enterprise” concerning Storm, trying Ante Gotovina, Milan Markac and Ivan 
Cermak together. It was argued that the term would negatively impact Croatia’s 
international reputation, national consciousness and allow Serbs to ask for reparations 
(Subotic 2009, 100).  
 The Declaration claims that its purpose and true objective was the liberation of 
occupied Croatian territory and the establishment of the constitutional and legal order of the 
Croatian State there, which had been under occupation for four years prior (Sabor 2006). It 
also says that the ultimate goal of the Serbian occupation, aggression and ethnic cleansing, 
was to create a “Greater Serbia,” keeping the language of Tudjman and the Declaration on 
the Homeland War. Operation Storm was justified as a last resort, given that they exhausted 
all possibilities of peaceful reintegration of the occupied territories into the constitutional, 
economic and social order of the Croatian State (Sabor 2006).
 After describing the nature, purpose and course of action in Storm, six groups of 
adjectives are used to describe the event: it was “international, legal, and legitimate”, 
“victorious”, “anti-terrorist,” “decisive,” “unforgettable,” and “final.” The content under 
classing Storm as unforgettable stipulates that it is the obligation of the Croatian Parliament, 
Croatian expert community, Croatian scientific and educational institutions, and the media, 
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to not forget the battle that took place, but rather, to remember it as it becomes part of the 
Croatian “useful past” for future generations (Sabor 2006). However, there is a change of 
tone in the next paragraph, which includes a clause: 
Preserving the memory of "Operation Storm" should also include the right of all 
scientists, journalists, human rights activists and others to substantively and 
freely investigate the dark side of this and all other operations: violations of war 
and humanitarian law, crimes, human casualties and suffering […]. 
As they chose not to forget this moment in Croatian history, the concession is that all aspects 
of the event need to be remembered, even the loss of life. Although, the parliament may well 
mean Croatian loss of life, it does not specify, meaning that crimes committed against Serbs 
after Storm could qualify in this instance.   
 The narrative of Storm manifests itself in the policy issue of the treatment of 
minorities, particularly the return of Serb refugees. Prime Minister in 2010, Jadranka Kosor, 
was interviewed on Europe District (2010), a program in partnership with the EU, which 
aired on the French TV station, France 24, about this issue and said: 
It is a fact that in the 1990s Croatia was under attack, and that part of its 
territory was occupied. Hundreds of thousands of Croatians were expelled by 
the alliance of the Serbian paramilitaries and the Yugoslavian army in Croatia. 
As for the Serbian minority, it is true that a number of people left.  They were 
not forced to leave, but they left. But today, those who wish to come back to 
Croatia can do so. The return must happen on a voluntary basis and in safe 
conditions. We’re co-operating on this issue with a representative of the Serbian 
minority.  Our action is well co-ordinated, and I’m satisfied with the results. We 
have already spent five billion euros on refugee return programs. I’m confident 
that we’re upholding all the commitments made by the government of the 
Republic of Croatia. 
A number of breaks with the previous discourse can be identified in this speech. For 
example, although Kosor emphasises that Croatia was “under attack,” she does not say they 
were under attack by “chetniks,” nor “the Great Serb oppressors” like previous documents, 
but she assigns blame to the “Serbian paramilitaries and the Yugoslavian army,” an 
intentional choice of words. Furthermore, Kosor demonstrates how Croatia now shows an 
interest in the return of Serb refugees, which was unthinkable in Tudjman’s rhetoric. This is 
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undoubtedly down to EU influence, because along with tackling corruption and organised 
crime, the return of refugees is a top priority for Brussels. 
 Kosor’s rhetoric, however, also reflects an attempt to cover the full details of the war 
that harms Croatia’s reputation. For example, through the narrative of the ICTY, we know 
that during and after Storm, many Serbs had “left,” and Kosor emphasises this twice, but a 
better word might well have been “fled.” She also omits the fact that many Serbs were killed 
in the aftermath of Storm, mostly elderly people, who could not leave their homes. The fact 
she emphasises that they “were not forced to leave” suggests Croatia was in no way 
attempting to ethnically cleanse the region, yet according to the ICTY, the “joint criminal 
enterprise” is responsible for being “criminally liable for having knowingly failed to prevent 
or punish criminal acts or omissions of their subordinates,” given that “these crimes were a 
natural and foreseeable consequence of the execution of the enterprise,” including the 
removal of the majority Serb population from the RSK region (ICTY 2012a). The discourse of 
Kosor exemplifies how narratives are simplified in order to be consumed by internal and 
external audiences despite the constraints of the interview method (Pavlakovic 2009). Thus, 
Croatian defensiveness of the legitimacy of the origins of the state still remain. Interestingly, 
the Serb narrative of this event calls Storm an attempt at ethnic cleansing, comparable to 
Srebrenica, which is another version of this narrative. 
War Generals, the ICTY and Official Commemorations: Best of Both Worlds
In this period, Croatian politicians and wider society were confronted with the trial and 
verdicts of their remaining war generals and leaders. On 15 April 2011, the Hague sentenced 
Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markac to 24 and 18 years imprisonment respectively, for crimes 
against humanity and the violations of the laws or customs of war (ICTY 2012a). The third 
man implicated within the Storm “joint criminal enterprise”, Ivan Cermak, was acquitted of 
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all charges laid against him. The response by the Croatian Republic at the sentencing of 
Gotovina in particular, produced protests in Croatia and abroad, but with less anxiety and 
relative quiet than previous occasions (Allcock 2009, 371). 
 On 11 August 2011, the President of the Republic of Croatia, Ivo Josipovic, was 
interviewed for Europe District (2011b) concerning this polarising issue, and he was asked 
whether, like some Croatians, he regarded Gotovina as a hero?:
He was a very distinguished fighter, definitely. What I have to stress is that, 
whether we like the verdict or not,  Croatia is part of the international judicial 
system; Croatia must obey the verdicts of the ICTY. We are going to see what 
the final verdict will be because it’s now in the appeal process. Part of my 
policies is reconciliation. That means the ability and capability of states and 
nations to reconsider history and to recognise what was good and what was 
bad in their policies of the past years.
Josipovic does not refer to Gotovina as a “hero,” but rather, “a distinguished fighter.” His 
response is very diplomatic, omitting his personal opinion in favour of what seems most 
relevant, which is “to obey the verdicts of the ICTY.” In fact, the notion of reconsidering 
history is welcomed, which sets his discourse apart from Sanadar’s, who was opposed to the 
ICTY’s ability to “falsify history,” (Pavlakovic 2009). Josipovic, like his predecessor, uses the 
rhetoric of transitional justice when he speaks of “reconciliation.” His standpoint on the 
Gotovina case suggests Croatia is coming to terms with the past and accepting the necessary 
conditions to move forward. This signifies that individualisation discourse with transitional 
justice rhetoric has been further strengthened by Josipovic, and it encapsulates the lasting 
indirect influence of the EU due to issue-linkage with the ICTY.    
 The most recent commemoration of Victory and Homeland Thanksgiving Day on 5 
August 2012, in Knin, included a number of milestones. According to Josipovic (Gulf Times 
2012): 
Croatia won the war, it is a great achievement […] but Croatia still has to battle 
to win in peace […]. Winning in peace means also extending a hand to our Serb 
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citizens, acknowledging and bowing to their victims, and by this,  he voices 
hope that Croatia will become a “shining European star.”
This language is very different from the presidential addresses at the former 
commemorations, and it shows that Croatian society is changing because it tolerates such 
discourse from its President. Furthermore, the 2012 commemoration in Knin was attended 
for the first time by an ethnic Serb official, Veljko Dzakula, who is head of the Serb 
Democratic Forum non-governmental organisation and a former rebel official (Gulf Times 
2012). Despite some politicians, like Jadranka Kosor, being more supportive of war generals 
(Vukic 2012), the majority of Croatian political elites have made gestures of reconciliation 
with Serbia in this period: Mesic directed an apology to victims of Croatian war crimes; 
Josipovic visited Belgrade; and Sanadar attended a Serbian Orthodox Church for Christmas. 
These are signs that Croatian political elites have changed their past perceptions of the war 
from Tudjman’s period, and they have done so with the “best of both worlds,” by 
individualising crimes and maintaining the legitimacy of the Homeland War at the same 
time.
EU Influence and the Politics of Memory: So similar, so different, so European
It is unanimous, scholars, Croatian politicians, and the public, saw no other way other than 
acknowledging that Croatia’s future was bound to the EU. Mesic (2005) said:
Our future does not consist of returning to the past or negating or being silent 
on the past but rather […] accepting the truth about the past is one of the key 
prerequisites for making a stride through the European gate.
There may have been polarisation over the indictment of war criminals and Storm (the past), 
but charting the course towards the EU (the future) meant one final narrative, the grand 
narrative of Croatia as a “European” state, initiated a change in Croatian domestic past 
perceptions (Subotic 2009, 121). After Yugoslavia’s disintegration, Croatia used its pre-
Yugoslav past, where it was a member of the Central European Habsburg empire, to promote 
itself to the world. The Croatian National Tourist Board’s current campaign depicts Croatia 
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as “the Mediterranean as it once was”; forgotten is Croatia as an authoritarian aggressor state 
in the Yugoslav War, or a member of the former Balkan SFRY, or even the former fascist Nazi 
puppet regime. Rather, Croatia’s European and Catholic heritage, jewel coastlines and 
islands, are the collective memories that have been revived, within and outside of Croatia.
 To show the extent of this return to Croatia’s European past, the EC, in February 
2012, launched a video clip that challenged EU viewers’ perceptions of the SEE aiming to join 
the EU. The campaign aims at raising awareness and “showing another side of the region,” 
away from the legacy of war, strife and unrest (EC 2012a). The slogan of the campaign is “so 
similar, so different, so European.” This strategy of comparison is a powerful tool in 
grounding these states’ identities in Europe. This is done with the use of footage of locations 
that could be mistaken for other parts of Europe. For example, footage of a grand theatre 
with symphony music playing in the background is shown with the heading, “Austria?”, in 
the foreground. The heading then fades as a larger heading, “Croatia”, replaces it, suggesting 
that Croatia’s cultural capital is like that of Austria. By comparing Croatia with Austria, the 
EC illustrates that Croatia belongs within Central Europe. It is said that, history, especially 
national history, is grand narrative; History and memory shape national identity; identity 
shapes and reinforces the boundaries of the state (Schwandt 2001). This idea has been 
powerful for the politics of memory in Croatia; it is the key to normalising Croatia, which is 
reflected in the probability of Croatia’s accession to the EU in July 2013. 
Conclusion
Through this study, domestic perceptions of the Croatian past have evidently undergone 
change over time. In the first period studied, the government’s xenophobic and autocratic 
regime emphasised Croatia purely as a “victim” of Serb aggression, and it proved to be a 
roadblock for a true confrontation of the past. It was not until Croatia’s democratic transition, 
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explored in the second period in this study, that a new discourse emerged which 
individualised war crimes—a process that was proven to be indirectly linked to Croatia’s 
closer EU relations and conditionality criteria. In the final period studied, it was argued that 
individualisation discourse teamed with transitional justice rhetoric was strengthened, 
reflected in political discourse, commemorations of Storm, and gestures of reconciliation 
with Serbia. 
 Yet, perceptions of the past in postwar Croatian society, particularly from 2000 
onwards, prove also to be a double-edged sword; although an individualisation of war 
crimes was achieved, government rhetoric still preserved the dignity of the Homeland War, 
particularly in periods after international pressure was removed from the government. 
Presently, the policy of cementing Croatia’s identity in Europe is one way both Croatia and 
the EU sought to normalise the country’s identity. Analysing the period after Croatia’s 
accession to the EU could extend this study further, to examine whether perceptions of the 
past, particularly concerning war generals and Storm, remain as they are, revert back to 
Tudjman’s discourse, or further acknowledge Croatian wrongdoing. 
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Chapter Three
“If Serbia Stops…” 

This chapter examines the changing domestic perceptions of the Serbian recent past through 
three main periods, from the conclusion of the Yugoslav War to the present. It first traces the 
final half of Serbian and Yugoslav president, Slobodan Milosevic’s leadership, from 1995 to 
2000. It then analyses past perceptions from the beginning of EU commitment to the country 
in 2001 to the signing of the SAA at the start of 2008. The final period encapsulates the 
change in past perceptions during the leadership of a pro-EU government, from 2008 until 
mid-2012. Through this analysis, several changes to the Serbian postwar narrative are 
identified, though, the most important changes surround the arrest and extradition of war 
criminals, particularly Slobodan Milosevic and Ratko Mladic. To the EU, these men were 
measurable indicators that Serbia was coming to terms with its past. The EU has 
subsequently indirectly influenced the past perceptions that have come from the arrest of 
these men primarily through rewards attached to conditionality, issue-linkage with the ICTY, 
and transitional justice. The chapter structure is identical to that of the previous chapter (See 
p. 23). 
1995-2000: Yugoslavia Under Milosevic
Remembering the Yugoslav War: Milosevic’s Diplomacy Disguise
 Serbian perceptions of the past were predominantly shaped by one man during this period
—Slobodan Milosevic, the president of FRY since 1997. Similar to Croatia’s Franjo Tudjman, 
Milosevic utilised the past in a strategic manner, attempting to create a past-present 
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continuum, which enabled him to present the political issues of his time in historical terms. 
Moens (2012) argues that this “presence of the past” aimed to turn collective memory into a 
political weapon. This political weapon is particularly useful for nationalists, as it is argued 
that almost all nationalist movements locate their contemporary political goals within a 
wider historical framework (Moens 2012). Milosevic successfully wielded this weapon, 
because his policies were supported by the majority of the Serbian public (Subotic 2009, 67).
 In spite of his seemingly effortless mastery of mass demonstrations, since his rise to 
power, Milosevic had rarely appeared in public or on television (Djilas 1993, 4). For this 
reason, a narrative analysis of Milosevic’s discourse is based on an interview from the 
Washington Post during the Kosovo conflict in December 1998. In this interview, four 
perceptions of the past can be traced that made up the dominant Serbian narrative of the 
Yugoslav War: the notion of a “Greater Yugoslavia”; the West’s role in Yugoslavia’s 
disintegration; the Bosnian War as a “civil war”; and the notion of a “Greater Albania,” 
which caused the Kosovo conflict. 
 First, the notion of a “Greater Yugoslavia” was used by Milosevic to disguise the 
nationalist rhetoric he incited in the public consciousness. It is well known that Serbia’s 
political elite attempted to hold on to the Yugoslav federation and provide (armed) support 
to Serbian minorities in the other republics (Moens 2012). According to Moens (2012), this 
was presented as a new episode in a much older “Greater Serbia” ideal, rooted in the mid-
nineteenth century struggle for independence from Ottoman rule. Moreover, as early as 1994, 
a UN report recognised there was a Serb policy of “ethnic cleansing” and “Greater Serbia,” 
which was created through nationalism, fear and repression (Bassiouni 1994). Interestingly, 
when Milosevic (1998) was asked whether he had a Greater Serbia program in mind, he 
diplomatically explained his support for a “Greater Yugoslavia”:
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We considered that Yugoslavia was a good solution for the national interest of 
the Serbs, because in the former Yugoslavia all Serbs lived in one state in 
different republics. But they were in one state.  The Muslims were also in one 
state in former Yugoslavia.  The Croats were in one state and Macedonians and 
others. That was the interest of all, not only of the Serbs.
Interestingly, in contrast to Tudjman’s rhetoric, Milosevic never openly acted against anyone 
who attacked him by using derogatory language; he never publicly attacked or insulted 
Albanians or Croats or Bosnian Muslims in his speeches, and only a few of his remarks could 
be considered as incitements to war (Djilas 1993, 5).
 The second past perception relates to how the break-up of Yugoslavia was caused by 
the West, instigated by Germany who essentially wanted Croatia to be independent 
(Milosevic 1998). This narrative contributed to skepticism over Euro-Atlantic structures in 
Serbia. Third, Milosevic (1998) framed the Bosnian War was a “civil war,” where Serbia only 
helped out their “relatives” in the RS. Serbians did not commit atrocities, nor was Serbia an 
aggressor state, but rather, “If Serbia was not so engaged and if I had not been so engaged in 
the search of a peaceful solution, Dayton wouldn't have been possible” (Milosevic 1998). This 
discourse contradicts ICTY jurisprudence, which had unequivocally stated that the Bosnian 
war was an international conflict with significant involvement from the Serbian state’s 
security, police and military apparatus (Subotic 2009, 60-61).
 Finally, Milosevic’s (1998) discourse on Kosovo is framed not as a matter of human 
rights or democracy, but a matter of geopolitics. In his mind, Milosevic blames Mussolini for 
creating a “Greater Albania” that placed Albanians in parts Kosovo, Macedonia and Greece 
(Milosevic 1998). Thus, Kosovo is a “separatist movement” according to Milosevic (1998), 
comparable to cases in Northern Ireland, on Corsica, and the Basque region in Spain, except 
that, as opposed to Northern Ireland, Serbia “did not occupy northern Albania. Kosovo is a 
part of Serbia.”  
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War Generals and the ICTY: Serbia as Victim 
No high-profile war generals were arrested in this period, although, shortly after the 
establishment of the ICTY, many Serbs were indicted, including the main suspects 
responsible for the massacre at Srebrenica, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. The Law on 
the Cooperation with the ICTY was blocked in parliament, and Serbia refused to 
acknowledge the ICTY, even when the prosecutors wanted to investigate crimes committed 
against Serb civilians (Subotic 2009, 39). The narrative responsible for this non-compliance 
stance was simply that Milosevic (1998) was unaware of their whereabouts, and furthermore, 
that it was strictly prohibited by the Serbian Constitution, claiming that he could not 
extradite his citizens. 
 Another reason for non-compliance with the ICTY was the notion that Serbs are 
victims who are treated differently and unfairly by the ICTY. This is evident in Milosevic’s 
(1998) rhetoric, when he says, “The Serbs are the victims of the latest holocaust in this 
century, there is no doubt about that […]. The use of “Holocaust” seems like an exaggeration, 
but it usefully demonstrates the deeply felt sense of victimisation that pervaded the Serbian 
consciousness at the time. Furthermore, Serbian people, since Milosevic came to power, have 
been socialised into believing that their nation is a victim of vast outside conspiracies that 
want to subjugate or destroy it (Subotic 2009, 69). Information evidenced in the 1994 UN 
Report stipulated that, more than any other nation of the former Yugoslavia, Serbians are 
fully convinced that history has treated them unfairly because their collective historic 
memory recounts domination by the European powers, conquest by the Ottoman Turks, 
occupation by the Axis powers during the Second World War, betrayal by their fellow Slavs 
of the Croatian Ustasa regime, and discrimination under President Tito's communist 
government (Bassiouni 1994).
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EU Influence and The Politics of Memory: Bombs and Bills Damage Roadblock of 
Authoritarianism
Similarly to Croatia, the Milosevic regime has been classed as authoritarian by many 
observers (Hall 1999; Pribicevic 2008; Judah 2009), which is a roadblock to developing closer 
relations with the EU. For example, Serbian opposition parties complained about the election 
process; the rules for candidates, the level of media access, the actual conduct of elections, 
and the overall treatment of opposition leaders (Hall 1999, 242). Furthermore, many 
opponents of the Milosevic regime did not survive assassination attempts. By the time the 
Kosovo crisis had escalated, the public became disenchanted with the manipulation and bias 
of the state media (Judah 2009, 308). It was only the gravity of the NATO bombings as a 
result of the conflict in 1999 that brought home the reality of war, shocking Serbian society 
(Judah 2009, 338).
 As discussed in the previous chapter, the presence of an authoritarian regime is less 
likely to enact the politics of memory and come to terms with the “truthful” past 
(Langenbacher 2010). The man who held the most power in Yugoslavia was also the primary 
constructor of narratives and perceptions of the past, but to many international observers, he 
was to blame for Yugoslavia’s disintegration (Silber & Little 1995; Thornett & Ryan 2006; 
CNN World 2006). Yet, unlike Croatia, where death made way for a reformist government, it 
was the West’s financial rewards offered to Serbia for ousting him that enabled change. A 
Serbian politician at the time, Maja Tasic, blatantly said that, until then, the Americans had 
bombed them with bombs; “now we are going to be bombed with money” (Judah 2009, 339). 
The US spent 77 million dollars, and the EC spent 8.8 million euros in heating fuel during the 
winter to opposition-controlled municipalities (Judah 2009, 340). When Milosevic called for 
early presidential elections in October 2000, Vojislav Kostunica ran against Milosevic, and he 
was successful, with 50.24 per cent of citizens voting for him (Judah 2009, 343). When 
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Milosevic refused to accept the result, massive protests organised by Zoran Djindjic, who 
would soon become Prime Minister, finally led to Milosevic’s defeat on 5 October 2000. As 
long as the biggest “old regime spoiler” was still in power, alternative discourses that risked 
criminalising the past and the regime could not emerge.
2001-2008: The Turbulent Ride Consolidating Democracy

Remembering the Yugoslav War: Confronting Conspiracies, Milosevic and Kosovo 
There was a radical change in the official discourse over what happened in the Yugoslav War 
with the arrival of Zoran Djindjic as Prime Minister. He was not publicly popular like the 
new Yugoslav President, Vojislav Kostunica, yet, he did not rely on popularity to initiate 
reforms. His rhetoric resembled a motivational speaker who talked directly into the 
problems facing Serbian society. He often used the nouns “reforms” and “future,” and he did 
not frame his speeches in a historical continuum like Milosevic. Rather, he tried to break 
from the past to focus on the present and future, making him a pragmatist. He was against 
nostalgia for the former regimes, and he tried to inspire a change in the Serbian mentality of 
defeatism and victimhood. During a political tour, Djindjic (2002) addressed the idea of a 
global conspiracy against Serbia, calling it “nonsense.” 
 Djindjic (2002) also tried to change domestic past perceptions concerning the 
Yugoslav War and who was to blame for it:
From my historical experience I can tell you that the 90s will never happen 
again. We are ten years older, poorer and more ruined and that is the price of 
our stupidity and irresponsibility […] We paid the price of being infatuated in 
89’ by that man, believing that he was to be the one to take us to the future, that 
he was the best among us. We paid a price for that. 
This discourse does not contain any justification of a “Greater Yugoslavia” nor an assigning 
of blame to the West. Rather, Djindjic was able to agree with Western commentators (Silber & 
45
Little 1995; Thornett & Ryan 2006; CNN World 2006), who saw Milosevic as the architect of 
the break-up—which is, on its own, a discourse of individualisation. Djindjic was 
assassinated in 2003 by the Zemun Gang, and in response to his death, a documentary of his 
speeches was compiled and distributed, titled, “If Serbia Stops” (Ako Srbija stane), which 
purposed to make sure Serbia would continue reforms and move towards Europe in a 
speedy and pragmatic fashion. Yet, the ideal, in some ways, died with him. 
 A discourse that did not change regardless of which party was in power in this 
period was that over the status of Kosovo. Kostunica (2008) addressed Kosovo’s 
independence on Statehood Day, where he asked:
What is Kosovo? Where is Kosovo? Whose is Kosovo? Is there anyone among 
us who is not from Kosovo? Is there anyone among us who thinks that Kosovo 
does not belong to us? Kosovo—that’s Serbia’s first name. Kosovo belongs to 
Serbia. Kosovo belongs to the Serbian people. That is how it has been forever. 
There is no force, no threat, and no punishment big and hideous enough for any 
Serb, at any time, to say anything different but Kosovo is Serbia! 
The use of the phrase “Kosovo is Serbia” is similar to that of Milosevic’s rhetoric a decade 
earlier. In this sense, Serbian identity and collective memory over Kosovo can be understood 
as fixed in this period, in keeping with the narrative that separatist terrorist movements 
should not be rewarded with independence by the international community (Judah 2009, 
358). Additionally, countries that did not accept Kosovo’s independence, such as Russia, 
questioned where the line would be drawn for other volatile regions, citing the example of 
Georgia, Spain and other areas (Judah 2009, 358).
War Generals, the ICTY and Official Commemorations: Serbia as Victim and Perpetrator
The arrest and extradition of Slobodan Milosevic in 2001 became a measurable indicator to 
the EU that Serbia had begun to deal with its past. Although, for the Serbian public, it was 
viewed as more of a business transaction than a matter of justice because the government 
acted for the sake of prestige, for avoiding the consequences of more sanctions, for the future 
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of their children, and, most importantly, for financial aid. Some members of the government 
said bluntly, “We wanted American money, we wanted EU money,” (Subotic 2009, 46-47). 
Djindjic himself explained his motives behind why he went against the Constitutional Court 
and Kostunica (as he wanted to offer Milosevic amnesty) to arrest him:
[Milosevic] had to end up in The Hague because it was inevitable. If he had not, 
he would have been tried in the [national] court and acquitted; and the court 
would have had me sentenced and put to jail, the same court operating 
presently. There was no chance whatsoever for us to stand up proud before the 
world and say: we will try him in our country and we will do that,  we are 
proud people. No, we could have only embarrassed ourselves and have him 
acquitted like a hero because of the lack of evidence.
However, Djindjic’s pragmatism did not permeate down to a majority of the population. 
According to opinion polls, 42 per cent of those asked gave Milosevic five out of five for 
defending himself at the Hague Tribunal (Ash 2002). Furthermore, more than two-thirds said 
the tribunal was biased against Serbia, and more than half could not—or would not—name a 
single place where Serbs committed war crimes (Ash 2002). According to commentator 
Timothy Garton Ash (2002), “This is a nation in denial, locked in a narrative of its own 
victimhood.” Sabrina Ramet (2007) diagnoses Serbian political culture as having a “denial 
syndrome” because of an unwillingness to confront the role played by Serbia as the primary 
aggressor in the 1990s. Instead, blame is shifted onto non-Serbs, while victimised heroes are 
exalted, like Karadzic and Mladic (Kajfes 2011). 
 
 Djindjic also challenged Serbia’s incomplete compliance with the ICTY with 
figurative language to better relate to politically interested Serbian public:
There are certain conditions and standards that in cooperation with the 
international community we have to follow the same way we have to pay tolls 
at the highway. Otherwise we have to use the local road. One of those 
conditions is to cooperate with The Hague Tribunal. Not because someone 
particularly likes that Tribunal, not because that tribunal is just or not, but 
simply because that is one of the conditions that all the countries, wishing to 
become a part of the club, will have to fulfil […].   
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This discourse demonstrates how the acceptance of the authority of the ICTY is the first step 
towards joining “club” Europe (the EU). However, because the motivation to comply is 
predominantly financial, the discourse lacks the rhetoric of transitional justice. 
 Much like the effect of the ICTY victim-perpetrator counter-narrative in Croatia, 
domestic transitional justice mechanisms were biased in Serbia. For example, the Serbian 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established in 2002 but it was disbanded after one 
year (USIP 2011). It had a poor composition because Kostunica appointed mostly nationalist 
conservative academics who held a strongly pro-Serbian interpretation of the wars, and an 
anti-internationalist inclination (Subotic 2009, 54). The commission’s mandate was to create a 
comprehensive historical narrative of how the former Yugoslavia had broken up and who 
was to blame rather than doing the practical work of truth commissions—to conduct 
hearings with witnesses and survivors of human rights abuses (Subotic 2009, 54-55). Clearly, 
Kostunica felt threatened by the ICTY’s role as historian, as he claimed, “History is being 
written in the Hague […] and the Serbs must intervene to make sure it is written right,” (Ash 
2002).
 Later in the period, the EU’s issue-linkage with the ICTY did affect past perceptions 
in Serbia, at least at an official level, through video footage that exposed Serbian war 
criminals. The Srebrenica Tape was shown during the cross-examination of former Serbian 
assistant interior minister Obrad Stevanovic in 2005, who testified in Slobodan Milosevic’s 
defence case at the Hague. The tape documented the execution of six Bosniak men by 
members of a notorious paramilitary unit who operated under the control of the Serbian 
secret service (Uzelac 2005). Later that evening, a number of Serbian TV stations rebroadcast 
the tape, which shocked Serbian society, and it had a number of aftereffects (Uzelac 2005). 
First, it improved Serbia’s reputation as international praise was given to Serbia for their 
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immediate reaction to this incident when they arrested the perpetrators involved in the crime 
(Subotic 2009, 63). Second, the footage challenged the narrative of the Bosnian War being a 
“civil war” because it was one of the more significant pieces of evidence proving Belgrade’s 
direct involvement in the Srebrenica massacres (Uzelac 2005). Third, the discourse of 
individualisation of crimes emerged, as the Serbian defence minister stated that, “The entire 
case indicates only the responsibility of individuals and not the people and the 
state” (Subotic 2009, 64). In wider society, however, only 32 per cent of citizens thought the 
video was authentic, and for those who actually saw it, only 45 per cent believed its 
authenticity. Arguably, some Serbs interpreted the tape as another way to destroy Serbia’s 
reputation and make them feel collective guilt (Subotic 2009, 64).
 Therefore, collective memory did not truly acknowledge errors done by Serbs, 
making commemorations one-sided. The sites of commemoration relevant to Serbia are 
mostly situated within Bosnia, particularly at Srebrenica, and the neighbouring village of 
Bratunac—the location where crimes committed by Bosniak forces against Serb civilians and 
soldiers took place. For example, after the release of the Srebrenica Tape, the Srebrenica 
ceremony was only broadcast on a liberal TV network, whereas the Serb ceremony at 
Bratunac received blanket coverage over the Serbian media (Subotic 2009, 66). The 
newspapers inflated the number of Serb victims and included multiple historical 
inaccuracies and exaggerations of events during the Bosnian War (Subotic 2009, 66). 
However, new president, Boris Tadic, apologised to Srebrenica victims when he attended the 
2005 commemoration there (AFP 2012), which was definitely a clear sign of fostering 
reconciliation in the region.  
EU Influence and the Politics of Memory: Rewards Produce Results
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Relations between the EU and Serbia had improved slowly with the democratic transition in 
2000, but with the death of Milosevic during his trial in 2006, along with Serbia’s failure to 
locate and extradite Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, EU negotiations over Serbia’s 
accession were brought to a halt. The following year, relations improved (See Appendix 4, 
Period Two), but when Kosovo declared independence in early 2008, the government 
collapsed, provoking an early election (Judah 2009, 360). It was the rivalry between 
nationalist Kostunica, who outright wanted to abandon EU progress because many of its 
members recognised Kosovo, and reformist Tadic, who agreed that the EU was in the best 
interest of all Serbs. Interestingly, the EU was sensitive to this situation, as they wanted to 
ensure a united pro-EU government was elected. Therefore, the EU made a political move by 
signing the SAA with Serbia in April 2008 (See Appendix 4, Period Two). The successful pro-
EU elected government quickly improved cooperation with the ICTY, surprising the 
international community and the Tribunal itself when Karadzic was arrested in Belgrade in 
July 2008.
 Overall, this period encapsulates how official discourse changed concerning the 
start of the Yugoslav War, who was responsible for it, why viewing Bosnia as a “civil war” 
was no longer feasible, and why cooperation with the ICTY was needed. However, the 
numerous examples given in this period suggest that the politics of memory in Serbia was 
not as deep because reformist discourse and actions did not socialise wider society away 
from the nationalistic discourse of the Milosevic regime. Therefore, a comprehensive and 
cohesive facing of the past did not emerge, but a turbulent ride in consolidating democracy 
and reforms.
2009-2012: Lone Serbia Moving Forward
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Remembering the Yugoslav War: Memorialising Srebrenica 
Given Serbia’s ties with the EU were finally strengthening because of the election of a pro-EU 
government (See Appendix 4, Period Three), would Serbian past perceptions differ from the 
previous two periods where the politics of memory was non-existent or shallow? Analysing 
the narrative of the Yugoslav War, it has evidently undergone change across the four 
elements studied throughout this chapter. First, borrowing from David Binder’s (2009, 40) 
journal article title, it appears “Greater” has “vanished from the Balkan vocabulary,” or at 
least the Serbian vocabulary. Binder (2009, 47) claims that today, mention of a Greater Serbia 
is restricted to the chambers of the ICTY. 
 Following on from the discourse in Period Two, Serbian official discourse does not 
blame the West, nor consider Bosnia a “civil war.” These refined perceptions of the past are 
implied within the Serbian Parliament’s (2010) Declaration on Srebrenica—the official state 
apology to the Bosniak victims of the massacre. Yet, replacing the “civil war” discourse is 
Serbia’s conundrum over whether to acknowledge Srebrenica as an act of “genocide” or not. 
The fifth paragraph of the Declaration stipulates that its understanding of the event comes in 
line with the ruling of the ICJ in 2007, which defined the massacre as genocide. However, the 
term “genocide” is not used to describe the event in this Declaration, and neither is the 
phrase “war crime” used. Not using the term genocide can be seen as a way to avoid facing 
the truth about Srebrenica. What the Declaration (Serbian Parliament 2010) does offer is an 
acknowledgement of all victims of Yugoslavia’s violent disintegration and an apology to 
victims of Srebrenica specifically: 
The National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia most severely condemns the 
crime committed against the Bosniak population in Srebrenica in July 1995 in 
the manner established by the ruling of the International Court of Justice […] 
extending on the occasion condolences and apologies to the families of the 
victims that everything possible had not been done to prevent the tragedy.
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Alternatively, these paragraphs can be seen as working to clear the Serbs’ name and 
reputation, particularly with the phrase, “Everything possible had not been done to prevent 
the tragedy.” This is consistent with the ruling of the ICJ—which found that Serbia was not 
directly responsible for the genocide in Bosnia, but it was responsible for not preventing the 
atrocity. This ruling makes it difficult to charge any Serbian war criminal with genocide in 
the domestic War Crimes Chambers (Subotic 2009, 61). Additionally, a discourse of 
victimisation still lingers as the government expects that, “The highest authorities of other 
states on the territory of the former Yugoslavia would also condemn the crimes committed 
against the members of the Serbian people in this manner” (Serbian Parliament 2010). 
 However, there have been changes on the level of official discourse regarding the 
Kosovo conflict, with political elites like Tadic and Vuk Jeremic (Serbia’s former foreign 
minister under Tadic), omitting the need to frame the Kosovo conflict as one of separatism. 
However, both agree that, “Serbia is not going to recognise Kosovo’s independence, 
implicitly or explicitly” (Europe District 2011c; Europe District 2012). Tadic also exclaimed 
that, “Kosovo is where my nation’s identity lies, where the roots of our culture are […]. 
Kosovo is the foundation of Serbia’s history and this is why we cannot give it up,” (Subotic 
2011, 325). Only one party, Cedomir Jovanovic’s Liberal Democratic Party, argued that Serbia 
should recognise Kosovo and move toward EU membership by fighting domestic 
corruption. Nevertheless, in this period, relations with Kosovo improved, allowing Serbia to 
attain EU candidature in 2012 (See Appendix 4, Period Three). 
War Generals, the ICTY and Official Commemorations: The Mladic Factor
In this period, the expectation of arresting Serbia’s remaining war generals was high, 
particularly Ratko Mladic, indicted by the Hague Tribunal in 1995 for crimes against 
humanity, violation of the laws or customs of war, and the genocide of around 8,000 Bosniak 
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men and boys at Srebrenica (ICTY 2012b). As long as Mladic was at large, he took hostage the 
future of Serbia’s European integration (Subotic 2009, 77). However, he was finally arrested 
in May 2011, on the same day that the EU’s foreign policy chief was in Belgrade to discuss 
Serbia’s application for EU membership (Woodsome 2011). In response to the timely arrest—
which also came off the back of pressure from the ICTY prosecutor to develop a more 
rigourous approach to finding Mladic—Tadic said:
We are not making calculations when and how to deliver […] We are doing that 
because we truly believe this is in accordance with our law. This is because of 
our people, Serbs. This is because of moral dignity of our country and our 
people. But this is crucially important in terms of reconciliation between people 
that are living in the region of southeast Europe's former Yugoslavia.
Tadic attempts to explain the motive of capturing Mladic as one of “moral dignity” rather 
than appeasing the international community, which demonstrates that Serbia can fulfil 
conditionality criteria without “rewards” that stem from it, whether the arrest was timely or 
not. This notion has been replaced by transitional justice rhetoric emphasising 
“reconciliation,” which is different from Djindjic’s financial and somewhat selfish motives for 
arresting Milosevic. Even though the handing over of indicted war generals is a polarising 
issue in Serbian society, scholar Ker-Lindsay, claims, “It’s not about forgetting what took 
place in Bosnia or, indeed, the entire Western Balkans in the 1990s […] but it’s about 
recognising that Serbia’s got to atone for this, pay its price and move on. And people 
understand that Mladic is absolutely central to that process” (Woodsome 2011). The arrest of 
Ratko Mladic can be seen as a measurable indicator both of Serbia’s seriousness in 
confronting the past, but it will also improve Serbia’s international reputation and invite the 
international community’s support in its reconciliation process (Woodsome 2011). 
 Serbian society has replaced a discourse of ICTY bias with cynicism, because, 
according to new President Nikolic, the realisation that the Serbs “lost the war” explained 
why there were more Serbs than other ethnicities facing charges from the ICTY (Borger 2012). 
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Nikolic did however say, “There are fewer members of other nations and their sentences are 
somewhat milder. So the Serb people tend to believe that justice is not equal for everyone. 
But we have accepted the jurisdiction of the Hague Tribunal and we therefore accept its 
judgements” (Borger 2012). This coming to terms with the rules of the game, knowing that 
Serbia’s future is most likely within the EU, shows that Serbia, though polarised, can change 
their domestic perceptions of the past, even if all that encompasses at this point is the arrest 
of Mladic and a political maturity in accepting that his fate is a legal matter.
 The role of non-judicial transitional justice mechanisms, like apologies, was utilised 
by Tadic to foster reconciliation in the region, and demonstrates the change in the 
perceptions of the past coming from the top—the leader of Serbia. For example, in July 2010, 
Tadic again visited Bosnia to appear at a commemoration of the fifteenth anniversary of the 
Srebrenica massacre. In November of the same year, Tadic extended a personal apology to 
the 260 Croatian victims during the 1991 three-month siege of the Croatian town of Vukovar. 
Whether these positive official commemorations have indeed transcended into the minds of 
the general public is out of the scope of this thesis, but a change above, could indicate a 
process of top-down shifting of past perceptions in postwar Serbia.
EU Influence and the Politics of Memory: Balancing Europeanisation and Nationalism
Kajfes (2011) described the period of Tadic’s presidency as one of a balancing act between 
Europeanisation and nationalism. On Europe District (2011a), Tadic was adamant about 
where the future of Serbia lies:
But for Serbia, it’s very important to go towards the European Union. For 
Serbia, it’s very important to solve all the conflicts that exist in the Balkans. For 
Serbia, it’s very important to create peaceful policies,  to create a different image, 
taking into consideration what happened in the past. 
Tadic is aware of the negative stereotypes that Serbia has been given because of their recent 
past, but unlike Milosevic, whose rhetoric was defensive, Tadic’s rhetoric is active, in that he 
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recognises it is the responsibility of Serbia to actively change that reputation. One way this is 
occurring is through the National Tourism Organisation of Serbia (2011), which released a 
campaign last year entitled “SoulFood Serbia” that presented Serbian gastronomic products 
as an essential part of the country's tourism offer, reminiscent of the appeal for France for 
many tourists. The video version even uses French words such as “bon appétit” and “bon 
voyage.” Interestingly, the EC’s (2012a) video campaign, “So similar, so different, so 
European,” has also compared Serbia to France with footage of two young women—one 
wearing a beret—exiting a patisserie onto a street likened to the architecture of Paris. 
Reasons for this comparison may stem from the fact that France, unlike Germany, was 
initially in favour of a combined Yugoslavia, alluding to some sort of affinity between these 
two states. These videos illustrate that both Serbia and the EU are beginning to highlight 
Serbia’s European identity through comparison.  
 However, the recent rise of far-right nationalists, hooliganism, homophobia, and 
anti-Europeanism threatens further EU progress. Groups like the SNP 1389 (the year of the 
Battle of Kosovo) display allegiance to Mladic and rally support to enter into the political 
mainstream. Additionally, Tadic was defeated by Tomislav Nikolic at the Presidential 
elections in May 2012, with many observers doubting Nikolic’s sincerity in re-branding 
himself as pro-EU, considering he used to be famous for his anti-Western rhetoric (Europe 
District 2012). Nikolic, from the SNS, formed a coalition with Kostunica’s party, the DSS, who 
are deeply held euroskeptics. He also said that Kosovo Serbs are under the threat of 
“genocide”—a term likened to the rhetoric of Milosevic. Overall, Serbia has engaged in the 
politics of memory most successfully in this period, through the presence of a united pro-EU 
government that has forged closer relations with the EU. Yet it is only at the beginning of the 
process of normalising its identity away from the legacy of war. 
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Conclusion
This study has shown that domestic perceptions of the Serbian past have undergone slow 
change over time. In the first period studied, the government’s nationalistic and autocratic 
regime emphasised Serbia purely as a “victim” of a global conspiracy against Serbs, of the 
West’s premature involvement in the Yugoslav War, and of separatist terrorists in Kosovo. 
This proved to be a roadblock for a true confrontation of the past that was only defeated by 
an internationally financed opposition. It was not until Serbia’s democratic transition, 
explored in the second period of this study, that a new discourse emerged which blamed 
Milosevic for the demise of Serbia, and where ICTY co-operation could be justified, at least 
for financial reasons. In the final period studied, it was argued that the politics of memory 
was more successful than in the second period, as effort was continued by pro-EU politicians 
to formally condemn war crimes committed by Serbs. These results have been achieved 
primarily through the arrests of Milosevic and Mladic, making then measurable indicators to 
the EU that Serbia was coming to terms with their past.
 However, the politics of memory in postwar Serbia has been perplexed because 
nationalist discourse has lingered in the public consciousness more so than reformist 
discourse. This has meant that, although past perceptions have changed within each period 
to question the pure victimisation of Serbs in the War, it has not been forgotten. Serbia has 
only just become an official EU candidate country, and no dates for accession negotiations 
have been set. The new leadership pair who were former ultra-nationalists, Tomislav Nikolic 
and Ivica Dacic, may threaten the normalisation the Serbia’s identity, and its future in 
Europe. “If Serbia stops”, it could be many years before Serbia can truly “atone for this [their 
role in the Yugoslav War], pay its price, and move on,” (Woodsome 2011). The impact of a 
nationalist government on EU influence in domestic past perceptions in Serbia is a welcomed 
extension for future research which could demonstrate whether Serbia moved quickly 
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towards the EU, or whether it slowed in pace; whether its relationship with Kosovo 
improved or worsened; and whether these factors changed past perceptions beyond the 
progress made by Tadic, or whether they reverted to Milosevic-era rhetoric.
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Chapter Four
The Pilgrims’ Progress: Croatia and Serbia In A 
Comparative Perspective 
This chapter assesses the similarities and differences between the politics of memory in 
postwar Croatia and Serbia. Concerning similarities, it argues that the desire to enter the EU 
has enacted the politics of memory in both states. This is evident through narrative change 
and improved EU relations. Concerning differences, it argues that Croatia has engaged more 
deeply in the politics of memory than Serbia, primarily because Serbia was unable to 
extradite its war criminals at the pace of Croatia. The chapter gives four reasons why this 
was the case: differences concerning regime transition type, old regime spoilers, the 
prevalence of a discourse of victimisation, and greater contest at the elite level.
Similarities in The Politics of Memory of Postwar Croatia and Serbia
Narrative Change
Chapters Two and Three have clearly shown that, in Croatia and Serbia, narratives have been 
tailored in light of the desire for EU entry. More specifically, though, there are three 
similarities in the way change was effectuated: the removal of authoritarian leaders, the use 
of strategic discourse, and the transformation of national identity. First, the removal of 
authoritarian leaders was the catalyst for confronting the past in both states. Political elites 
are masterminds of memory for the nation-state, and the type of regime they institute will 
determine what is remembered and what is forgotten. For example, at the end of the Bosnian 
and Croatian Wars, both states experienced authoritarianism, censorship and widespread 
corruption. In this environment, Tudjman and Milosevic could disseminate nationalistic 
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discourse and myths defending the honour of the states they were representing without 
challenge. Consequently, the prevalent narrative in both states was victimisation (See 
Appendix 5; p. 25, 43). When both states were rid of these leaders, alternative discourses 
could emerge that made enacting the politics of memory possible. This is because, in contrast 
to Tudjman and Milosevic, the democratic governments of Racan, Sanadar, and Mesic in 
Croatia, and Djindjic, Tadic and Cvetkovic in Serbia, possessed the legitimacy that is so 
central to creating an environment of transparency (Langenbacher 2010, 36), and importantly, 
they were responsive to EU conditionality criteria. Therefore, the discourses of victimisation 
gradually evolved into individualisation and Europeanisation.   
 Second, the use of strategic discourse enabled new governments to attain positions 
that were more widely accepted in the sight of the EU (which will be discussed on p. 60), 
without criminalising the past per se. For example, the discourse of individualisation of war 
crimes was a successful strategy, because it enabled cooperation with the ICTY and appeased 
nationalists at the same time (See Appendix 5; p. 29). It meant that the state could be 
absolved of blame for the wars, preserving its integrity and legitimacy (See p. 49). 
Furthermore, ICTY compliance in Croatia and Serbia, when it was unpopular, was framed in 
economic terms (See pp. 30, 47-48). Economic incentives led to creating the option of 
“voluntary surrender” for war generals. In Croatia, before the arrest of Gotovina, talks 
occurred suggesting the government had pledged full assistance and support for the 
general’s defence in the Hague if he surrendered voluntarily (Hedl 2005). Likewise, Serbian 
law stipulated that the government would guarantee voluntarily surrendered suspects the 
right to return to Serbia from The Hague while on bail, while their families received financial 
assistance (Subotic 2011, 323). Importantly, voluntary surrender was framed as a patriotic 
duty to the homeland in Serbia, as once voluntarily surrendered, most indictees were 
59
congratulated by the elites given what they were doing was for the national interest (Subotic 
2009). 
 Third, the transformation of national identity saw both states, in some ways, 
“Europeanise.” For example, in Period Three of both states’ history (See Appendix 5), both 
nations’ elites emphasised a clear EU direction for the future. This was reflected in both 
states’ tourism videos, and incidentally, this commitment was mirrored by the EC’s media 
and communications video clip comparing Croatia and Serbia with members of the EU, (See 
pp. 37-38, 55). These comparisons staple the Western Balkan identity within what many 
would consider to be mainstream “Europe.” This effort by the EU is vital to keep the appeal 
and desirability for EU membership thriving in these states. 
Improved EU Relations
The tailored narratives have given Croatia and Serbia positions that are more acceptable in 
the sight of the EU. This is evidenced in three ways: The first is the arrest of war criminals, 
which are signposts, or measurable indicators to the EU that a society is coming to terms 
with its past (See pp. 46, 53). All Croatian and Serbian ICTY indictees have now been 
arrested, which fulfils the political criteria of EU conditionality. Second, the improvement in 
regional cooperation and efforts at reconciliation, as another feature of the EU’s 
conditionality criteria, has also propelled relations between the states and the EU. 
Additionally, the language of transitional justice appears in the discourse of both states (See 
pp. 30, 36, 53, 54), and points to a real outworking of the politics of memory, further 
demonstrating the change in discourse from the authoritarian era in both states. 
 The most obvious feature of improved EU relations is the change in EU trajectory in 
both states. From 2000 to 2012, Croatia went from a potential candidate country to an 
acceding country, and Serbia went from a potential candidate to an official candidate 
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(Appendix 5). Therefore, when comparing narrative change with EU trajectory, it can be 
concluded that the deeper the politics of memory, the closer the relations with the EU. 
Furthermore, the depth of the politics of memory enacted in a country is determined by how 
strong the desire to enter the EU is in the first place.
Differences in the Politics of Memory of Postwar Croatia & Serbia
Regime Transition
The differences in the dynamics of the process of regime transition can account for why 
Serbia was unable to extradite their war criminals at the pace of Croatia.  These dynamics are 
overlapping yet twofold: the fact that Tudjman died but Milosevic was ousted, and the level 
of involvement by the West in Serbia compared to Croatia. In the first case, transitional 
justice theorists (Barahona de Brito 2001, 11-14) cite three different types of transitions that 
shift a non-democratic regime type to a democratic one:
(a) Transition by rupture, which occurs after foreign intervention, and gives 
total victory to the occupying forces. Ruptures can also occur when there is 
a revolution or civil war, a loss of legitimacy or key power and ideological 
resources. In some cases, defeat is partial or temporary.
(b) Transition by reform, which entails a balance of power between the old and 
new elite.
(c)  Transition by extrication, whereby pacts are made that produce rewards if 
upheld. 
What these scholars do not take into account are the “natural” ruptures of death of elites that 
can incite change in the political environment. This was the cause of transition change in 
Croatia when Tudjman passed away in December 1999, and left no successor comparable to 
himself, politically and ideologically, to continue his authoritarian regime. Although, the 
HDZ had already lost legitimacy in the minds of the people due to corruption and 
subsequent poor economic performance around the same time. Nevertheless, this sufficient 
rupture occurred in Croatia without intervention from external actors like the EU or the US. 
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Therefore, the defeat of the old regime was more complete, opening up the past and 
establishing truth and justice policies more quickly.
 In Serbia, like the HDZ, SPS was losing legitimacy due to political and economic 
corruption, although Milosevic, the most powerful man in Yugoslavia, continued to be 
supported by a majority of the public. As a result, it took the Serbian opposition a long time 
to mobilise successfully to win the next elections. However, unlike Croatia, the Serbian 
opposition was financed by the international community (See p. 44). Offered to a war-torn, 
impoverished state, extrication on part of the West effectively incited a revolution to oust 
Milosevic. Moreover, the West’s focus on the situation in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999 may have 
detracted Western observers from Croatia. Political pressure was also exerted on the 
Tudjman government to fulfil Croatia’s international obligations, (Kearns 1998, 248), but it 
did not compare to the West’s strategy towards Serbia—political pressure plus economic 
sanctions and NATO bombing raids. 
 The argument that can be put forward is that a transition by rupture institutes a 
pattern whereby constant pressure would have to be exacted upon Serbia by the EU to get 
Serbia to come to terms with its past and redress past atrocities. For example, negotiations 
into Serbia signing the SAA were postponed in 2006 for over a year because cooperation with 
the ICTY had not been improved. Interestingly, the EU used this tactic on Croatia in 2005, but 
instead of the SAA, it was negotiations for accession. Why did this tactic of withholding EU 
progress occur at different stages in Croatia and Serbia’s EU trajectory? Moreover, why did 
Croatia, contrary to popular assumptions, receive candidacy a year before the arrest of Ante 
Gotovina, while Serbia did not receive candidacy until after the arrest of Mladic?   To answer 
these questions, it is important to remember that both Croatia and Serbia displayed 
incomplete compliance to the ICTY at various stages for reasons that cannot be elaborated 
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upon here but which many studies have explored (Freyburg and Richter 2010; Ozegovic 
2012). The EU requested “full co-operation” with the ICTY from both states, which did not 
mean the countries had to arrest all the indictees at once, but they needed to offer proof that 
sufficient effort was being made to make arrests. This sufficient effort was clearly lacking in 
Serbia for a lot longer than in Croatia which explains why withholding EU progress occurred 
in different stages in Croatia and Serbia’s EU trajectory. 
 Concerning the question about candidacy, theoretically, the case of Croatia proves 
that the arrest of war criminals is only necessary before accession negotiations. Yet, two 
reasons may be offered for the difference between the states in this area: first, the Karadzic 
and Mladic indictments, who are currently being tried for genocide, are more serious than 
Gotovina’s conviction, which amounted to crimes against humanity. Genocide is the more 
serious crime because of its specific "intent to destroy” a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group, in whole or in part, which is not the intent of a perpetrator of a crime against 
humanity (Aydin n.d., 7).  Second, because indictments against Serbs are more serious than 
Croats, and because Serb indictments are more numerous than Croats, it cannot be ignored 
that Serbia does hold a reputation as the aggressor in the Yugoslav War. Therefore, the EU 
put more pressure on Serbia to arrest all war criminals before candidacy, whereas, in Croatia, 
this pressure was not attached to the extradition of war criminals. As the Serbian political 
elites and public denied the seriousness of the crimes committed by Serbs for a longer 
period, this can explain why the EU had to continue exerting more pressure on Serbia, and in 
turn, prolonged arresting these criminals, creating a cycle of resistance.   
Old Regime Spoilers
The presence of old regime spoilers in the government of Serbia until 2008 furthermore 
accounts for Serbia’s inability to extradite Karadzic and Mladic earlier. According to Subotic 
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(2009, 69), Kostunica instrumentalised the old regime so that they would not stage a coup, 
and so they remained in the military, police, and secret service. For example, at the arrest of 
Mladic, Tadic said there would be an independent investigation concerning why it took so 
long to locate him, but it seems unlikely that the military was unaware of his, and Karadzic’s 
whereabouts—at least early in their indictment periods where Mladic was said to walk about 
freely in a small Serbian town. The conundrum in Serbia was, “Who does the arresting, and 
who does the investigating? Who are the agents of justice” (Subotic 2009, 69)? In contrast, 
Croatia’s Stipe Mesic retired war generals when they stepped out of line with the new 
reformist government (Steele 2000). Consequently, the old regime loyalists in Croatia 
remained vocally present but politically marginalised (Subotic 2009, 112). 
Discourse of Victimisation
The prevalence of a discourse of victimisation can also account for why Serbia was unable to 
extradite their war criminals at the pace of Croatia. The prevalence of this discourse comes 
down to the strength of nationalist parties in Serbia in comparison to Croatia, because 
nationalist parties typically ignored Serbian fault in the War. With no desire to confront the 
past, the incentive to arrest war criminals was low. This explains why the EU offered the 
carrot of SAA membership before the elections in 2008—to incite the election of a pro-EU, 
reformist president and prime minister (which is explained in more depth in the next section; 
See p. 50), to oust Kostunica’s nationalist DSS. Although, the EU was sensitive to Croatia’s 
domestic political climate as well, but it only intervened to help the already reformist 
government appease nationalists (See p. 30). This feature of Serbian domestic politics mirrors 
a wider trend within European politics, where far-right parties (like the Front Nationale in 
France and the Lega Nord in Italy) make euro-skepticism a policy position along with 
patriotism and xenophobia. This is why commentators question new President Nikolic and 
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the genuineness of his pro-EU stance, because he refuses to confirm whether he would have 
handed over Karadzic or Mladic (Borger 2012). 
 The Kosovo issue is also important for the continuing strength of nationalist parties 
in Serbia. There is no such issue comparable in Croatia after the retrieval of Knin in 1995, 
which was testament to how sites of memory can underpin the national narrative (See p. 24). 
For Serbia, the “myth of Kosovo” effectively perpetuates victimisation discourse because it 
paints Serbia as an innocent nation who chose moral purity over military victory after defeat 
in the 1389 “Battle of Kosovo” against the Ottoman Turks (Anzulovic 1999). According to 
Mertus (2006), during the prime of Slobodan Milosevic’s political career, Kosovo became the 
single most important myth informing Serbian collective memory, and it remains the single 
most important myth determining the future direction of the Serbian nation-state (Mertus 
2006). While the discourse on Kosovo by Serbian elites has not changed drastically (See p. 
52), it is now balanced with a desire for EU membership more strongly than when Mertus’ 
article was written. Nevertheless, the politics of memory will need to penetrate both the 
political elite and the public consciousness deeper before Serbia accedes into the EU. 
Contest at the Elite Level 
The contest between reformist and nationalist elites was a lot more fierce in Serbia’s 
parliamentary republic than in Croatia’s, which meant that it was more difficult to arrest war 
criminals. The first contest was between Prime Minister Djindjic and President Kostunica. 
The Milosevic regime left Serbia ruined, particularly economically, with a reputation as an 
international pariah, and with the burden of constantly having to deal with the legacies of 
the Milosevic years (Judah 2009, 348). These included constant pressure from the EU and the 
ICTY, the status of Kosovo, the union with Montenegro, and how to purge the Serbian 
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system of Milosevic loyalists, which exacerbated the political stand-off between Djindjic and 
Kostunica—who disagreed on all the aforementioned matters (Judah 2009, 348). 
 Later in this period, Prime Minster Kostunica and President Tadic’s ideologies 
concerning the future of Serbia—and indeed the desire for EU entry—clashed with the 
independence of Kosovo in 2008, provoking the collapse of the government. During their 
election campaigns, Tadic said EU integration was in the best interests of the Serbian people 
to continue the Battle of Kosovo, whilst Kostunica wanted Serbia to abandon its ambition to 
join the EU at least while most of its members recognised Kosovo, (Judah 2009, 360). He 
pointed colleagues to the fact that Mikhail Saakashvili’s Georgia was being backed by the US 
as a way of pursuing American interests in the Caucasus, and that Serbia could do likewise 
for Russia in Europe (Judah 2009, 360). With added EU support through the signing of the 
SAA earlier that year, the election of the reformist government of Tadic and Cvetkovic 
occurred. There was no contest at the elite level, which made enacting the politics of memory 
more successful in Serbia (See p. 55), and eventually led to the arrest of both Karadzic and 
Mladic—measurable indicators to the EU that Serbia was coming to terms with its past. This 
is no coincidence, as the whole thesis has pointed to the fact that the desire for EU entry was 
the catalyst for enacting the politics of memory in postwar Croatia and Serbia.
Conclusion
This study has shown that Croatian and Serbian domestic perceptions of the past have 
undergone change. This change is a result of the removal of authoritarian elites, the wielding 
of strategic discourse and the transformation of national identity. Narrative change brought 
about an improved position in the sight of the EU involving transitional justice mechanisms, 
and an improved EU trajectory, confirming that indirect EU influence enacted the politics of 
memory in these states.
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 However, over time, Croatia managed to engage more deeply in the politics of 
memory than Serbia, which is evidenced by Croatia’s acceding status in comparison to 
Serbia’s recent official candidate status. The reasons for this difference lie in answering the 
question of why Serbia was unable to arrest its war criminals at the pace of Croatia. The first 
reason given suggested that Serbia’s regime transition type instituted a pattern of EU 
political pressure and resistance, whereas Croatia had a more thorough transition from 
authoritarianism, putting less pressure on the government. Second, Serbia did not prioritise 
the removal of “old regime spoilers,” unlike Croatia, who effectively mitigated the threat 
they posed. Third, a prevalent discourse of victimisation made the incentive to arrest war 
criminals low due to the strength of nationalist parties and the issue of Kosovo. Finally, 
contest at the elite level in Serbian politics meant Serbia was not able to fully commit to 
Europe until 2008, which allowed for a confrontation of the past indicated by the eventual 
arrest of Karadzic and Mladic. Overall, the long process towards the EU is a pilgrimage, and 
the EU has indirectly influenced these nation-states to open up their past through a desire for 
EU membership.
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Conclusion
Given the recent nature of the atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia, along with the 
prospect of EU membership and its subsequent conditionality criteria, Croatia and Serbia 
have entered into a period of post-authoritarian social memory-making called “the politics of 
memory.” Using this concept, this thesis has argued that Croatia and Serbia’s desire for EU 
membership has affected their domestic perceptions of the past, particularly in how 
narratives of the Yugoslav War have been tailored in light of the desire for entry.
 The narrative of the Homeland War in Croatia has been reconstructed across several 
issues. Originally, the Tudjman regime portrayed a purely defensive war against “chetnik 
anti-Croatianism.” In Period Two, the Homeland War was still defensive in nature, but it was 
fought against the less pejorative “great Serb aggressors.” In the most recent period of the 
Croatian narrative, the war was conceded to be a “last resort offensive” (concerning Storm) 
against the “Serb paramilitaries and the Yugoslav army in Croatia.” Concerning war crimes, 
the narrative began with no admission that the Croatian army committed atrocities, and 
cooperation with the ICTY was minimal. In Period Two, the discourse changed to account for 
the “war crimes” committed by “individuals,” and all those who were indicted were 
subsequently arrested or voluntarily surrendered to the Hague. Croatians understood that 
they were victims, but internationally seen also as perpetrators, which somewhat polarised 
Croatian society. Adding to the discourse of individualisation, the final period acknowledged 
Serb victims in commemorations. Croatia is able to accept the legal jurisdiction of the ICTY 
concerning the sentencing of war generals, who are perceived as “distinguished fighters” 
more than heroes. Overall, Croatian national identity went from not just what it was no 
longer—Balkan and Yugoslav—but to what it had always been—European—normalising its 
past and present. 
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 The narrative of the Yugoslav War in Serbia has also been reconstructed across 
several issues. Milosevic portrayed the government of Serbia as defenders of the territorial 
sovereignty of “Greater Yugoslavia,” not what he was accused of pursuing—a “Greater 
Serbia.” The Kosovo Conflict was framed as a problem of separatism, and Kosovo Serbs were 
victims of a new “Holocaust.” In Periods Two and Three, “Greater” was no longer a part of 
the Serb vocabulary, and political elites agreed that Milosevic’s flawed political philosophies 
were to blame for the Yugoslav War. Relations with Kosovo improved slightly, but newly 
elected nationalist politicians again say Kosovo Serbs are threatened with “genocide.” 
Regarding war crimes, Milosevic never admitted that Serbia committed atrocities in Bosnia 
because he framed the Bosnian War as a civil war. War indictees like Karadzic and Mladic 
were venerated, and the discourse of victimisation proliferated during the 90s. Cooperation 
with the ICTY was expectantly weak, as the Court was seen as illegitimate and biased 
against the Serbs. In Period Two, individualisation discourse and economic incentives were 
used to justify the arrest of Serbs, but denial and victimisation was still strong in the public 
consciousness. By Period Three, the narrative changed to acknowledge war crimes 
committed in Bosnia by Serbia, and with a united pro-EU government, Mladic and Karadzic 
were both arrested, seen as measurable indicators that Serbia was coming to terms with its 
past. Largely accepting the tribunal’s legal jurisdiction, the discourse of bias had been 
replaced by cynicism. Overall, Serbia, in many ways deeply European, continued to 
experience some ambivalence in its identity because of the presence of xenophobia and 
resentment due to the legacy of Western involvement in the War. 
 The similarities found concerning narrative change were the removal of 
authoritarian leaders, strategic discourse, and closer identification with the EU. The thesis 
has confirmed the theory of transitional justice scholars, that a necessary condition to 
opening up the past is the removal of authoritarian leadership. Furthermore, Croatia and 
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Serbia were able to secure positions that were more acceptable in the sight of the EU 
concerning matters of transitional justice, and as a result, their EU trajectory improved. 
 However, as this thesis has utilised a prevailing method of difference research 
design, it has found that the necessary conditions that affect the depth of the politics of 
memory are regime transition type and the presence of old regime spoilers, which prevented 
a complete democratic transition in Serbia, along with the perpetuation of a discourse of 
victimisation, and contest at the elite level. These conditions are overlapping and 
multifaceted, yet they underscore why the of arrest of high-profile war criminals, Karadzic 
and Mladic, were not conducted at the pace of Croatia. To prove that regime transition type, 
old regime spoilers, victimisation discourse, and contest at the elite level are sufficient 
conditions, the examination of other states that have suffered past atrocities is needed, such 
as Russia, Spain and Argentina, which this thesis recommends as a future research avenue.
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Appendix 1
Map of Croatia 
N.B. The shaded area belonged to the RSK from 1991-95
Map courtesy of Google Images 
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Appendix 2
EU-Croatia Relations Timeline (EC 2012c).
Period One: 1995-1999
1997    The EU adopts a Regional Approach to Western Balkan countries
June 1997  The EU decides not to invite Croatia to start membership talks
   The reason for no invitation is that they EU was critical of the 
   Tudjman regime's authoritarian tendencies.
26 May 1999  The SAP proposed to replace the 1996 Regional Approach

Period Two: 2000-2005
November 2000 Zagreb Summit launches the SAP 
29 October 2001 SAA signed
21 February 2003 Croatia applies for EU membership
June 2003  Thessaloniki summit
    This confirmed an accession perspective for Western Balkans 
   countries, including Croatia.
June 2004  European Council confirms Croatia as candidate country
December 2004   European Council sets starting date for negotiations
   This date was the 17 March 2005, and it was conditional upon full 
   cooperation with the ICTY.
1 February 2005 Stabilisation and Association Agreement comes into force
16 March 2005  EU postpones start of accession negotiations
   These negotiations were postponed due to a lack of cooperation with 
   the ICTY, but the EU adopts a framework for negotiations with 
   Croatia nonetheless.
3 October 2005  Croatia is now fully cooperating with the ICTY
   The European Council concludes that the last remaining condition 
   for starting negotiations has been met. Accession negotiations are 
   launched the same day.
20 October 2005 Beginning of the screening process
   Furthermore, an analytical overview and review of the degree of 
   harmonisation of Croatian legislation with the acquis 
   communautaire is made.
Period Three: 2006-2012
October 2006  Screening finalised
November 2006 EU gives Progress Report on Croatia
   The EU criticised Croatian institutions and the legal system. 
   Improvements were needed in the treatment of minorities, and to 
   tackle the problems of corruption and organised crime. 
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2008    EU announced Croatia could possibly accede in 2011
   Tougher action against corruption and organised crime needed.
2009    Slovenia vetoes Croatia EU accession negotiations
   A border dispute in Croatia’s region of Istria was the concern. 
30 June 2011  The meeting of the Accession Conference 
   Croatia at the Ministerial level closed negotiations on the remaining 
   four chapters of the acquis, thus closing the accession negotiations 
   with Croatia. 
1 December 2011 European Parliament gave a green light for Croatia’s EU accession
9 December 2011 Croatia signs Accession Treaty with the European Union 
22 January 2012 Referendum on Croatian EU membership
   66.27 per cent of voters said YES for the EU.
9 March 2012  Croatian Parliament Ratifies Croatia's Accession Treaty
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Appendix 3
Map of FRY
Map courtesy of Google Images 
Conflict and Territorial Change in Yugoslavia
DATE INDEPENDENCE EVENT
1991 Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia
• Ten Day War in Slovenia
• Croatian War of Independence 
(1991-95)
1992 Bosnia-Herzegovina
• Bosnian War (1992-95)
• SFRY becomes FRY
1995 • Dayton Agreement signed to end the War
1998 • Kosovo Conflict (1998-99)
2003
• FRY replaced by the State 
Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro
2006 Montenegro • Union becomes Republic of Serbia
2008 Kosovo
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Appendix 4
EU-Serbia Relations Timeline (EC 2012b)
Period One: 1995-2000
1997     Regional Approach
    The EU Council of Ministers establishes political and 
    economic conditionality for the development of bilateral 
    relations.
1999     The EU proposes SAP
October 2000    Fall of the Milosevic regime
November 2000  Autonomous Trade Preferences from the EU given to Serbia
Period Two: 2001-2008
June 2001   Feira European Council 
    States that all the SAP countries are “potential candidates” for 
    EU membership.
June 2003    Thessaloniki Summit
    The SAP is confirmed as the EU policy for the Western 
    Balkans. The EU perspective for these countries is confirmed.
October 2005    Launching the negotiations for a SAA
3 May 2006     SAA negotiations called off
    Serbia failed to locate and extradite Radovan Karadzic and 
    Ratko Mladic, the latter who was believed to have been 
    protected by the Serbian military. 
13 June 2007    EU resumes SAA negotiations with Serbia
    This is providing a clear commitment is made to achieve full 
    cooperation with the ICTY, by searching for Karadzic and 
    Mladic.
1 November 2007   The SAA with Serbia is initialed
17 February 2008  Assembly of Kosovo declares independence
29 April 2008    Serbia and EU sign the SAA and Interim Agreement 
    The EU said it was done to send a clear message to Serbia 
    that, “We care about them,” and it was successful, as it was a 
    tangible sign to the citizens of Serbia that EU membership 
    was a real possibility in the future, instigating the election of a 
    pro-EU government. 
21 July 2008    Arrest of war crime indictee Radovan Karadzic
9 September 2008   SAA and IA ratified by National Assembly of Serbia
Period Three: 2009-2012
22 December 2009   Serbia officially applied for membership in the EU
12 October 2011  EC recommends Serbia to become a candidate country
75
    Serbia will be ready to start accession negotiations as soon as 
    further good progress is made in one key area.
26 May 2011    Former Bosnian Serb war general Ratko Mladic arrested 
20 July 2011   Last war general, Croatian Serb Goran Hadzic was arrested
9 December 2011  The European Council delays Serbia’s candidacy
1 March 2012    The European Council granted Serbia candidate status
    Candidacy came off the back of concessions made concerning 
    telecommunications, electricity and identity documents 
    concerning Kosovo, which reflects the diplomacy that will 
    have to be used if a compromise is to be reached between 
    Belgrade and Pristina in the future.
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Appendix 5
 The Change in Official Discourse and EU Status from 1995-2012 in Croatia and Serbia 
Periods in Croatia/Serbia Croatian Narrative Serbian Narrative 
EU Accession Status in 
2000 Potential Candidate Potential Candidate 
Period 1 until 1999/2000 Victimisation Victimisation
Period 2 until 2005/2008
Economic reasons for 
compliance and 
Individualisation
Victimisation, 
Economic reasons for 
compliance and 
Individualisation
Period 3 from 2006/2009 Europeanisation and Normalisation
Victimisation, 
Europeanisation 
Present EU Accession 
Status Acceding Country Candidate Country
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